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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The international environmental treaty Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 and came 
into force in 2005, which aims at reducing green house gases (GHG) emissions and its impact 
in Global Warming. The Protocol introduced two policy instruments in order to achieve these 
targets cost effectively; project based mechanism and cap-and-trade. While these 
mechanisms can be used separately to achieve the environmental goal of the Kyoto Protocol 
cost effectively, a possible linkage between them may provide even more cost effective GHG 
reduction. 
 This study investigates the possible linkages of these two instruments. While the 
economic benefits of linkage makes it desirable in terms of businesses, the possible negative 
issues, such as design and environmental issues, creates an opposing arguments. In order to 
analyze the positive and negative sides of the linkage, this paper first elaborates the 
theoretical background of these two mechanisms. Moreover, this study takes advantage of 
the current linkage implications to study the significant benefits and disadvantages of the 
linkage.    
 The first policy instrument introduced by Kyoto Protocol is International Emissions 
Trading, which is also called cap-and-trade. International emission trading (Article 17) is a 
market based instrument. While an administration caps the total emission allowances and 
distribute to participants, they are allowed to trade their emission allowances. In case the 
participants do not exceed their total allowances, the mechanism reaches its environmental 
target.  
 Other policy instrument is called project based mechanism. Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) are the project based mechanisms 
introduced by the Kyoto Protocol. These mechanisms allow polluters to implement emission 
reduction project activities outside of their installations as an alternative to more expensive 
reductions in their own sources. These three mechanisms are also known as “flexibility 
mechanisms” (flexible mechanisms or Kyoto mechanisms). 
 This paper is divided into six sections. After this Introduction part in second section, 
the theoretical background of cap and trade scheme and project based mechanisms are 
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explained. In section three, the current major cap and trade schemes and project based 
mechanisms are investigated. Section 4 includes the definition of linkage, types of linkage, 
the benefits of linkage between cap and trade scheme and project based mechanisms. In the 
rest part of this section, the significant issues related with linkage is shown. In section 5, the 
linkage is examined practically. The current largest cap and trade scheme, European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and its linking to Clean Development Mechanism and 
Joint Implementation is studied. Last section is considered as a summarize of all topics 
explained through this study. 
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  “Carbon, the currency of a new world order” (Paul Kelly, The Australian, 21 March 2007) 
2. CATEGORIES OF EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEMS 
 Generally there are three different methods to reduce the effects of negative 
externalities. These methods are i) Command and Control or Direct Regulations, ii) Emissions 
Trading and iii) Emission tax. First method, Command and Control, can be applied by an 
authority. The last two methods are market based approaches. In theory, emissions trading 
and emission tax methods are considered as cost effective approaches to reduce 
environmental pollution.  
 Although Emissions Trading is usually used in order to define cap and trade system, 
this term refers to three different types of trading programs; Emission Reductions, Cap and 
Trade, and Emission Rate Averaging (see table 1). As this paper aims to investigate the issues 
on linkage between cap and trade schemes and emission reduction system, I only introduce 
these two approaches. 
Definitions of Various Emissions Trading Schemes 
 Cap and Trade Rate-based trading Project-based credit 
Application Applies to all emissions Applies to emission 
relative to some 
defined standard (e.g. 
emission per unit of 
output) 
Applies to emission 
reductions below 
defined baseline 
Allocation method Allowances are 
allocated by the 
regulatory authority 
Credits are generated 
when a source reduces 
its emissions below the 
standard 
Credits are generated 
when a source reduces 
its emissions below an 
agreed baseline 
Market dynamic Participants (and 
possibly outsiders) can 
buy and sell 
allowances 
Participation (and 
possibly outsiders) can 
buy and sell 
allowances 
Project hosts sell to 
those participants 
obliged to purchase 
external reductions 
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Coverage/participation Participation in the 
program is mandatory 
although trading is not  
Participation in the 
program is usually 
mandatory- sources 
must meet existing 
standards 
Participation in the 
program is voluntary 
for project hosts 
Examples Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol; 
US SO2 allowances 
program 
US phase-out of lead in 
gasoline 
Clean Development 
Mechanism  
Joint Implementation 
Table 1: Definitions of Various Emissions Trading Schemes1
 
 
a. CAP AND TRADE SCHEME 
 In economics, externality of an economic activity (spillover) is an impact on a third 
party. If this impact provides an advantage for the third party, it is called positive externality 
(external benefit), on the other hand, if it is a cost that is imposed on the third parties, it is 
called negative externality. Environmental pollution is one of the most important example of 
the negative externalities. Negative externalities can be created through either the 
consumption or production of a good.   
 The British economist Arthur Cecil Pigou, who developed the concept of economic 
externalities, recommended a tax to correct the negative externalities, in “The Economics of 
Welfare” (1920). In this paper Pigou first describes “the marginal social net product” and 
“the marginal private net product” as follows;  
“The marginal social net product is the total net product of 
physical things or objective services due to the marginal 
increment of resources in any given use or place, no 
matter to whom any part of this product may accrue. It 
might happen, for example, …, that costs are thrown upon 
people not directly concerned, through, say, 
uncompensated damage done to surrounding woods by 
                                                            
1  Adopted from “Act Locally Trade Globally”, 2005 OECD/IEA 
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sparks from railway engines. All such effects must be 
included-some of them positive, others negative elements-
in reckoning up the social net product of the marginal 
increment of any volume of resources turned into any use 
or place. . . . The marginal private net product is that part 
of the total net product of physical things or objective 
services due to the marginal increment of resources in any 
given use or place which accrues in the first instance-i.e. 
prior to sale-to the person responsible for investing 
resources there. In some conditions this is equal to, in 
some it is greater than, in others it is less than the 
marginal social net product (Pigou 1962, pp. 134-35)” 
 Further Pigou explains that in case these two concepts are not equal a tax or subsidy, 
depending on the sign of the difference, can be implemented to minimize the difference. 
This tax, which is levied on a market activity that generates negative externalities, 
internalizes the externalities inside the market (Groosman, 1999).  
 Later in 1960, Nobel laureate English economist Ronald Coase argues in his paper, 
"The Problem of Social Cost", that the Pigou's approach is narrow and should be changed in 
order to achieve a cost effective pollution reduction. While Pigou sees the environmental 
externalities as the consequence of market failures, Coase thinks that they rather depend on 
the failure of regulation. And he proposes an approach involved refocusing on property 
rights: 
“If factors of production are thought of as rights, it 
becomes easier to understand that the right to do 
something which has a harmful effect (such as the creation 
of smoke, noise, smells, etc.) is also a factor of 
production...The cost of exercising a right (of using a factor 
of production) is always the loss which is suffered 
elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that right-the 
inability to cross land to park a car, to build a house, to 
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enjoy a view, to have peace and quiet, or to breathe clean 
air (Coase 1960, p.22-23) .”   
 Basically, Coase argues that by making these property rights explicit and transferable, 
the market could play a substantial role in emissions reduction (Tietenberg 2006;p.3). After 
introduction of these main concepts, Professor John H. Dales popularized the concept of cap 
and trade, which is in practice called emissions trading scheme, through showing 
applicability of the theory on water pollution in 1968. Finally in 1972, Professor Montgomery 
formulized the cap and trade concept. 
 Cap and Trade Scheme is a cost effective system, in which there is an upper limit 
(cap) for aggregate emissions and this aggregate emissions is distributed to participants. 
Participants are allowed to trade their own emissions allowances. Main idea behind allowing 
trade is that a participant, which can reduce its one unit emission under the carbon price of 
one unit determined in carbon markets, can sell its over allowances to another participant, 
which has a higher marginal abatement cost. Seller can make profit by doing so and buyer 
can avoid paying higher abatement cost. In doing so, the system allows participants to sell 
and buy (trade) allowances under an upper limit (cap). 
 Tietenberg states that the appeal of emissions trading comes from its ability to 
achieve a prespecified target at minimum cost even in the absence of any regulator 
information on control costs. As long as marginal abatement costs (MAC) differ, incentives 
for trade exist. High marginal abatement cost firms buy permits from low marginal cost firms 
until the market clears and the demand for permits equals the fixed supply (Tietenberg 
2008, The Evolution of Emissions Trading).  
 In order to achieve an efficient (a cost effective) emissions trading system there 
should be a strong and a good defined pollution allowance market. This market is based on 
the idea that participants of the market have different marginal abatement costs2
                                                            
2  Pollution abatement (control) cost represent direct monetary expenditures by a society for the 
purpose of procuring resources to improve environmental quality or to control pollution (Hussen 2000).  
 (MAC). 
Some participants have rather low marginal abatement cost, some have rather high MAC. 
Entities (pollutants) pollute the environment during their production activities. While 
compensating for polluting the environment is more cost effective for some entities (entities 
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with high MAC), reducing pollution is more cost effective for others (entities with low MAC). 
Emissions trading is an efficient method in reducing environmental pollution considering 
these different structures of the entities. From society’s prospect, the optimal level of 
pollution emission is attained when the marginal damage cost3 (MDC) is equal to the 
marginal abatement cost, and hence the total disposal cost is minimized when this condition 
is met (Hussen 2000). 
 
Graph 1: Optimal Level of Pollution 
 In a cap and trade system, every participant is allowed to emit a limited value of 
emission. This is simply pollution right for participants. A pollution right under a cap and 
trade system may consist of a unit (pound, ton, etc.) of a specific pollutant. The authority of 
cap and trade system determines the total allowable permits and decides the distribution 
mechanism (auction, grandfathering, update). As I stated above the ideal limit of total 
allowable permits should be set by considering both the abatement and damage costs. In 
practice, however, accurate estimates of damage and abatement costs may not be readily 
available because they may involve astronomically high transaction costs (Hussen 2000). 
Hence, the authorities determine number of total allowable permits with the best available 
information on both abatement cost and damage cost they have. The success of this type of 
                                                            
3  The total monetary value of all the various damages resulting from the discharge of untreated waste 
into the environment is referred to as pollution damage (external) cost (Hussen 2000). 
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systems depend on the total amount of pollution. Therefore, the authorities should be very 
careful while they are deciding the total allowable permits and should update with every 
new available information. 
 
Graph 2:Illustration of Cap and Trade Scheme 
This is a simple illustration of how cap and trade scheme works. Basically, cap and trade scheme 
takes advantage of different MAC levels among installations. Blue line represents regulated cap in 
scheme. Let’s assume there are simply two enterprises under cap and trade scheme and they both 
have equal air pollution allowances. Enterprise A has a over emission level than permitted by scheme 
before trade of emissions right and abating its air pollution costs to enterprise A higher than 
allowance price. Enterprise B has a lower amount of emissions than permitted by scheme and it can 
reduce its air pollution with a low cost.  In this case, enterprise B sells its over allowances to 
enterprise A. At the end of this transaction, both enterprises are within their caps. 
 
 
 The success of the cap and trade systems depends on the design and implementation 
issues. The system can achieve its potential cost-reduction and environmental compliance 
targets, in case of a proper designed process. First step of this process is, as mentioned 
above, determining the total allowable permit number. After determining the total permit 
number the design issues should be specified properly. Design and implementation issues, 
which are explained below, can be ordered as follows; Emissions and sectors covered, 
allocation of  initial allowances, banking/borrowing, monitoring, accounting and reporting, 
offsets, linkages to other cap and trade systems, enforcement and compliance.    
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I. COVERED EMISSION GASES AND SECTORS 
 Initially a cap and trade system should decide which GHGs are capped under the 
system as well as which sectors are covered by the scheme. Measuring emissions in some 
sectors are harder than others and consequently, it may require a higher monitoring cost for 
these sectors. Typically, cap and trade schemes cover energy sectors and carbon intensive 
sectors. The more sector and gas covered by scheme, the more liquidity of the allowances 
on market. Hence, firms can comply with the scheme’s emission reduction target cost 
effectively. Authority should also define the threshold of the firm’s size included in cap and 
trade system. Buchner et al. state “the inclusion of small installations was not worth it” 
(Buchner et al. 2006). They explain that while a very larger number of small installations 
have a very small contribution to the system’s total reduction, they have a great transaction 
cost4
II. ALLOCATION OF INITIAL ALLOWANCES 
. While cap and trade systems can define the threshold of the firm size and covered 
sectors, it may allow to opt in to other installations to encourage emission reductions and by 
allowing opt in system can provide more liquidity on permit market. Some systems also may 
leave open the option opt-out for participants.   
 Once the total permit is defined, there are three main methods to allocate initial 
allowances; Grandfathering, Auction, and Update. Allowance process is very important for a 
cap trade system in context of program’s success and it should be fair. While participants can 
gain unfair profits through over allowances, this can also affect the environmental effect of 
the system. While systems can use only one of the following approaches, it may use also a 
hybrid distribution. 
 Grandfathering method is based on the past emission information of relevant 
installation. Authority collects historical emissions levels, output levels, or carbon intensity 
information on all installations and give to relevant installation a calculated amount of 
allowance without a charge. This method, basically favors the existing major polluters. 
Implementing this method can give incentive to the entities, which are unwilling to attend 
the system or have concerns about system. While this method favors participants, 
                                                            
4  for further reading see Buchner et. al. (2006) and Schleich and Betz (2004) 
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implementing this method costs to authority an additional amount and also time and effort 
in making the allocation. 
 In Auction method authority sells the available allowances to the highest bidder. First 
advantage of this method is that with this method authority can avoid the cost of developing  
and implementing a method for allocation of allowances. Another advantage is that 
allowances are at the same distance to all participants, all participants can attend to 
auctions. And the most important advantage is that authority can make profit through 
auctions, which can be used for other public purposes; to reduce other taxes, cut the deficit, 
fund R&D programs, and/or compensate industries, workers, and consumers who bear a 
disproportionate share of regulatory costs5
III. BANKING AND BORROWING 
. In the economics literature there is a strong 
agreement that implementing auction method instead of grandfathering is more profitable 
and useful. 
 Updating method is based on arranging allocation allowances according to new 
information over time.  Allocations are not fixed for all time based on some historic period 
but changed periodically as old units are shut down and new ones brought into service 
(Harrison and Radov 2002). 
 The banking component of the cap and trade system establishes procedures that 
allow firms to store emission reduction credits or allowances for later use in the system 
(Tietenberg 1985). As Ellerman et al. state “The experience with the programs indicates that 
inter-temporal trading has been important. The form that inter-temporal trading most often 
takes is credit or allowance banking, i.e., reducing emissions early and accumulating credits 
or allowances that can be used for compliance in future periods. Banking improves 
environmental performance and reduces cumulative compliance costs” (Ellerman and 
Harrison 2003). 
 Borrowing is another option to lower the cap and trade system’s short term cost for 
participants. Participants may emit more than they are allowed in a given year and they can 
borrow their allowances from future years to comply with the system’s target. 
                                                            
5  Allocation Allowances in a Greenhouse Gas Trading System, National Commission on Energy Policy 
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IV. MONITORING, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 
 Monitoring consists of two main steps. In first step, actual emissions of entities 
(participants) should be measured (at least to be estimated) by techniques, devices, 
instruments, and methods. Then these measured (or estimated) emissions have to be 
reported to authority. 
 The process under term accounting defined is that the distributed allowances are 
traded between participants, and in order to detect non-compliance these allowances 
should be registered and the authority has to make sure that each participant’s emissions 
does not exceed allowed allowances. 
 Reporting includes monitoring and accounting processes. A loose monitoring, 
accounting and reporting assessment risks the cap and trade system’s economic and 
environmental effect. 
 The crucial issues on reliable cap and trade system are these monitoring, accounting 
and reporting processes. In order to achieve a confidential cap and trade system both for 
public and business there should be a thorough monitoring and reporting assessment. As a 
cumulative inference from all cap and trade systems established till today, the requirements 
are as follows in order to design a successful cap and trade system; 
 registration of the ultimate owner of allowances or credits 
 independent monitoring of emissions from a facility 
 reporting of emissions to a central authority over a given period 
 verification of the level of emissions and confirmation of reductions (King, 2008).   
V. ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE 
 Cap and Trade systems has to define the targets (i.e. fixed, indexed) of the scheme as 
well as the penalty in case non-compliance to make a reliable system and to force the 
participants to comply with system’s target. The authority must be able to enforce 
compliance and thus to penalize or sanction participants for misreporting or emitting in 
excess of their permit holding (Peterson 2003). The penalty can be a defined amount per 
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over emitted emissions, or paying back subsidies, or even can be prison sentence for 
authorities of participant entity’s. In order to express the significance of this process 
Tietenberg (2004) puts it; “regardless of how well any tradable permit system is designed, 
non-compliance can prevent attainment of its economic, social and environmental 
objectives”.  
VI. OFFSETS 
 An offset is a reduction in air pollution from sources that are not subject to the cap 
and trade system’s border. Most of the cap and trade systems include offset option to their 
system, which provides many sources of low cost reductions and hence significantly reducing 
the overall cost of achieving an emissions reduction target. Although it can provide many 
opportunities to participants there are discussions about offset programs in the context of 
measure difficulties. Emission reduction credit system is explained in more detail in the 
following topic (Project-based Mechanism). 
VII. LINKING TO OTHER EMISSION REDUCTION SYSTEMS 
 Linkages among different cap and trade systems may provide participants more low-
cost reduction options. Also cap and trade systems can be linked with project based 
mechanisms. Essentially, linking can provide low-cost opportunity, more allowances on 
market, and more efficient market structure. Establishing an efficient linking between 
different designed systems requires a preliminary study. Different types of linkages, their 
benefits and issues are discussed in Section 4. 
 This design issues has to be clearly defined by regulatory authorities of cap and trade 
programs in order to instruct a reliable, environmentally and economically effective system. 
There are two main approaches while designing cap and trade systems; Upstream and 
Downstream regulations. Upstream cap and trade system implies a cap and trade , which is 
implemented where carbon dioxide enters the economy. This implementation could 
enhance economic efficiency and reduce the associated administrative burdens. 
Downstream cap and trade implies a cap and trade system, which is implemented where 
carbon dioxide emitted. While regulatory authority may decide to implement only one of 
these regulations, it can also implement a hybrid model.    
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How do companies benefit from emissions trading? 
Let’s say that companies A and B both emit 100,000 tonnes of CO2 per year. The 
government gives each of them 95,000 emission allowances. One allowance represents 
the right to emit 1 tonne of CO2. So, neither company is fully covered for its emissions. At 
the end of each year, the companies have to surrender a number of allowances 
corresponding to their actual emissions during the year. Companies A and B both have to 
cover 5,000 tonnes of CO2, and they have two ways of doing this. They can either reduce 
their emissions by 5,000 tonnes, or purchase 5,000 allowances in the market. In order to 
decide which option to pursue, they will compare the costs of reducing their emissions by 
5,000 tonnes with the market price for allowances. For the sake of the example, let’s say 
that the allowance market price is € 10 per tonne of CO2. Company A’s reduction costs 
are € 5 (i.e. lower than the market price). Company A will reduce its emissions, because it 
is cheaper than buying allowances. Company A may even reduce its emissions by more 
than 5,000 tonnes, say 10,000 tonnes. For Company B, the situation may be the opposite: 
its reduction costs are € 15 (i.e. higher than the market price) so it will prefer to buy 
allowances instead of reducing emissions. Company A spends € 50,000 on reducing 
10,000 tonnes at a cost of € 5 per tonne and receives € 50,000 from selling 5,000 tonnes 
at a price of € 10. So Company A fully offsets its emission reduction costs by selling 
allowances, whereas without the Emissions Trading Scheme it would have had a net cost 
of € 25,000 to bear. Company B spends € 50,000 on buying 5,000 tonnes at a price of € 10. 
In the absence of the flexibility provided by the Emissions Trading Scheme, company B 
would have had to spend € 75,000. Since only a company that has low reduction costs 
and therefore has chosen to reduce its emissions, like Company A, is able to sell, the 
allowances that Company B buys represent a reduction of emissions, even if Company B 
did not reduce emissions itself. 
Figure 1: Benefit of Cap and Trade Scheme6
b. PROJECT BASED MECHANISM 
 
 A widely used instrument in reducing GHG emissions is emission reduction credit 
system, which is also called as project-based mechanism (PBM) (Egan and Seidenberg 2009). 
Project-based mechanism refers to a low-cost method to reduce emissions below an agreed 
baseline in order to generate tradable emission credits. Typically, project-based mechanism 
is implemented voluntarily and only contribute to the rise of the supply of credits. A key 
difference between project-based mechanism and cap and trade scheme is that the latter 
                                                            
6  EU Commission MEMO/06/452, Questions and Answers on Emissions Trading and National Allocation 
Plans for 2008 to 2012, Brussels 29 November 2006 
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generate both a demand and supply for emission units, whereas project-based mechanism 
generate only a supply of credits (Bosi and Bygrave, 2004). Hence, project-based mechanism 
has to be linked to another emission reduction instrument. 
 The effect of GHG's in atmosphere is same regardless of where they are. Considering 
this fact, project-based mechanism has a significant impact in favor of environment. Beside 
this, a well defined and healthy operating PBM has many potential to increase; the economic 
efficiency of meeting participants of project’s emissions targets, stimulate to technology 
transfer, and sustainable development in the developing countries/regions. 
 While a project is occurring, there are mainly two sides of the project. The country, 
where emission reduction project is carried out, is called as "host-country", and the other 
participant, which supports project financially, is called as "investor country or party". The 
number of investor country/party in a single project can be more than one. Broadly, the 
types of projects can be categorized into five groups as follows; bio-sequestration, industrial 
gases, methane, energy efficiency, and renewable energy projects. 
 In case a project is verified as better than the baseline, and certified, the 
corresponding emission reduction credits of this project's performance will be issued and 
can be traded. The success of PBM depends highly on clear technical and methodological 
rules and administrative process that ensures emission credits are awarded to projects in a 
fair, consistent, and transparent manner (Kartha et al. 2002). Especially two concepts should 
be well defined by regulatory authority in order to ensure a successful (fair and reliable) 
emission reduction, baseline and additionality. Baseline is one of the biggest challenge for a 
PBM. Emission baselines are the best estimates (calculated levels with the best information 
accessible) or convention for the situation what would have occurred in the absence of a 
project. To avoid a misjudgment, which can reduce the potential positive environmental and 
economic impact of PBM, the baseline has to be defined clearly and accurately.   
 In comparison with cap and trade scheme, PBM activities have greater transaction 
costs for entities. In a PBM process, high transaction costs emerge in processes, information 
requirements for project, preparation of project as well as approval of project before a 
tradable emission reduction credit can take place. These transaction costs, however, can be 
reduced through a well pre-defined baseline, and increased experience. Project-based 
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mechanism also requires administrative cost, because projects has to be approved by a 
regulatory authority and total costs of this approval issue relies on how many project-based 
activities are implemented (Blyth and Bygrave, 2004). Another difference with cap and trade 
scheme is that while including medium and small installations under a cap and trade scheme 
is not feasible, project based activities can be implemented to these installations easily.  
 While PBM activities can be implemented to earn tradable emission credits, they may 
also be implemented without any tradable credits earning concern. Organizations or 
companies, which have environmental concerns or want to create a socially responsible 
company/organization image, may buy the credits from PBM activities an equivalent level to 
their emissions and hence, they may neutralize their carbon footprints through a PBM 
activity. This process is called as carbon neutrality or having a net zero carbon footprint.  
 As stated above PBM activities should be supplementary to another emission 
reduction instrument, hence there are two main application methods for governments. 
Governments either can buy directly international emission reduction credits in order to 
comply with its GHG target or can choose to allow entities to use the international emission 
reduction credits to meet their GHG obligations. 
 In order to comprehend clearly the aim of this study , which explains issues 
associated with linking project-based mechanism with cap and trade scheme, the most 
important concepts related to project based mechanism should be elaborated, namely 
baseline, additionality, permanence, leakage, and project boundaries.  
I. BASELINE 
 During monitoring process of a PBM activity, the biggest challenge is baseline issue. 
In order to earn tradable credits as a result of a PBM activity, the activity should satisfy the 
necessary requirements. To prove a project's emission reduction, emission baselines should 
be determined. The hypothetical case -what would happen if the project has not been 
implemented- is compared against the actual case, which is the case project is implemented, 
and if the actual emissions from project is lower than the baseline, the project is considered 
to contribute additionally and can be used to generate tradable emission credits. Difficulty of 
determining baseline arises from the uncertainties about future. GHG emissions hinge 
especially on economic growth, population growth, international fuel prices, technological 
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innovation, the development of lifestyle patterns, and so forth. Therefore, for the future 
data using past trends of GHG emissions is not a sufficient method. 
 Kartha and Lazarus state that systematic error in baseline estimation could result in a 
variety of undesirable economic and environmental outcomes. First one is that high (lax) 
baselines will increase global emissions, since excess credits will enable increased emissions 
without truly compensating emissions reductions and also this might cause undermining the 
credibility of credit trading and secondly, low (stringently) baselines will reduce crediting and 
the economic incentive for GHG mitigation projects, and also reduce the positive impacts of 
PBM activities (Kartha and Lazarus, 2002).  
 Broadly, there are three main baseline approaches, project-specific, multi-project and 
hybrid. Despite they are distinct in theory, in practice it can be difficult to label. First 
approach, Project specific baselines, is a bottom-up approach and relatively data intensive. 
Baselines are determined on a case-by-case basis, with project-specific measurements or 
assumptions for all key parameters (Laurikka, 2002). Admittedly, this method is relatively 
costly and time consuming, because of the difficulty of gathering information. The 
alternative approach is called as multi-project baselines7
                                                            
7  This method is also called as performance-standard, benchmarking or regional baseline. 
, which is a top-down approach. This 
method uses the aggregated data from the region the project is undertaken to determine a 
baseline. The combination of the two approaches is called a hybrid baseline, which is 
designed for the projects that neither fit project specific baseline approach nor multi-project 
baseline approach. As this method has characteristics from both approaches, it is more 
aggregate than project specific baselines and less aggregate than multi-project baselines. 
Because these methods’ results differ, Ellis and Bosi emphasizes "the choice of a baseline 
methodology can significantly affect the size of the emissions benefits that are derived from 
a project (Ellis and Bosi, 2000)". 
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Baseline Approach Description Calculation of annual Credits 
Project Specific Baseline determined on a case-by-case basis, with project specific measurements or assumptions for key parameters Difference between measured project emissions and estimated baseline emissions 
Multi Project  
(various designs) 
  
     -technology level Baseline emissions are specified per technology, e.g. on a rate basis such as t CO2/GWh. Difference between measured project emissions and inferred baseline emissions. 
     -(sub-)sector   
level 
Baseline is equivalent to a “performance standard” (or intensity indicator) that is aggregated at a certain level (e.g. sub-sector X in country Y, or sector P in country region Q). 
Projects/activities would only qualify for credits if emissions (per unit activity or output) were under the performance between project emissions and the performance standard 
Hybrid Baseline determined in a hybrid fashion, with some key parameters project-specific, and others standardized (the number and level of the standardized parameters will vary for each different project category) 
Difference between measured project emissions and estimated baseline emissions 
Table 2: Types of Emission Baseline Approaches 
 To build a fair, consistent and good working mechanism emission baselines should be 
standardized. One issue considering baseline standardization is that whether baseline should 
be fixed at the beginning of the project or re-estimated over the life of the project. If 
emission baselines are fixed at the beginning of the project for the lifetime of project, it is 
called as static, if it is revised during the project, than it is called as dynamic. Static baseline 
is more predictable, hence it has less uncertainty about the number of credits can be 
generated through project and it gives great incentives for investors with this feature. Also, 
this method has a lower transaction, monitoring and reporting costs comparatively to 
dynamic method, because static baseline requires only one estimate of a baseline. On the 
other hand, dynamic method can give more accurate results. At certain intervals during the 
project’s lifetime, dynamic baseline should be re-estimated, also re-reported and therefore, 
the expected credits should be re-estimated. Despite it can ensure better results than static 
baseline, its inherent structure causes higher transaction costs. 
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Emission reductions from a project for each period j during the baseline lifetime can be obtained 
from:  
 
_Enet = _Egross − Eleakage = (Eb − Ep) − Eleakage = (ebxb − epxp) − Eleakage                                     (1) 
 
where _Enet is the net reduction of GHG emissions (in tCO2 equivalent) taking into account the gross 
emission reduction within the project boundary (_Egross) and the leakage of emissions outside of the 
project boundary as a result of the project activities (Eleakage). Eb is the baseline emission level (in tCO2 
equivalent) within the project boundary, Ep the project emissions within the project boundary, eb the 
emission intensity (e.g. in tCO2 equivalent/GWh) and xb is the activity level (e.g. in GWh) in the 
baseline case. Correspondingly, ep is the project emission intensity and xp is the project activity level 
after the project implementation. 
In Eq. (1), the unit of the baseline (Eb) is tonnes of GHG emissions, and the baseline is therefore called 
absolute. If it is assumed that the baseline activity level is always equal to the project activity level 
(i.e. xb = xp), then _Egross reduces to: 
_Egross = Eb − Ep = (eb − ep)xp                                                                                                        (2) 
 
In Eq. (2), the baseline-case is only reflected by the baseline emission intensity, and the baseline is 
therefore called relative or rate. 
 
Figure 2: Emission Reduction Calculation8
 Another issue on baselines standardization is using whether absolute baseline (given 
in tCO2 equivalent, also: emission levels) or relative (rate-based) (given, e.g. in tCO2 
equivalent/MWh) baseline. Willems (2000) emphasizes the difficulty of using baselines 
expressed in terms of absolute tonnes of CO2 equivalent that they need assumptions about 
the activity level in case business as usual (BAU) and thus make the development of 
baselines and the process of project crediting more difficult. Ellis et al. (2001) state that 
absolute baseline would also allow credits to be generated if the production lagged with a 
slowed economy or the plant was simply closed down. On the contrary Baumert (1999) 
notes this type of baseline might prevent crediting from taking place while GHG emissions 
rapidly increase, because the focus is on “verified actual emission reduction”. On the 
contrary, relative baseline would allow projects where absolute emissions might increase 
due to a higher output to generate emission credits from “avoided future emissions” 
(Laurikka, 2002). Ellis et al. (2001) put it forward that relative baselines might also present 
challenges to countries’ and companies’ compliance with an absolute emission target. Rates 
 
                                                            
8  Taken from H. Laurikka / Climate Policy 2 (2002) 19–33 
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would thus be desirable for greenfield projects in growing economies in order to take into 
account the development objectives and needs of developing countries. 
 Emission baseline is very important regarding the success of the project based 
mechanism and its priori targets, which are environmental additionality and cost effective 
emission reduction. In literature an ideal emission baseline is described with the following 
requirements to achieve a reliable mechanism in terms of environment and economics; 
 be environmentally credible (to ensure long-term benefits greater than what would 
happen otherwise) 
 be transparent and verifiable by a third Party 
 be simple and inexpensive to draw up (low transaction costs) and 
 provide a reasonable level of crediting certainty for investors (Ellis and Bosi, 2000). 
II. ADDITIONALITY 
 Although there is not a generally accepted definition for the term "additionality", it 
refers, basically, to the net additional carbon sequestered by a carbon project. Once the 
baseline for a project is determined, the project should be assessed additional in order to be 
approved. The additionality criteria is assessed in respect to baseline, therefore determining 
baseline accurately is very important. As Graph 3 displays there is a important relationship 
between baseline stringency, transaction cost, and environmental additionality. While 
stringent baseline can ensure a high additionality and vice versa, the transaction cost has a 
inverse relationship with the number of the projects. Additionality is the most fundamental 
and contentious issue for project based mechanisms. Additionality criteria searches the 
answer of the following question, "would the project have happened anyway?". If the 
answer of this question is “yes”, then the project cannot be assessed as additional (WWF 
2008). 
 Because it is very hard to determine additionality in practice, different types of tests 
have been developed to maximize accuracy of additional testing and also to minimize the 
administrative burden for the project developer. There are two approaches to test 
additionality of activities, project based additionality testing and performance standards.  
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Graph 3: Possible effect of baseline stringency and complexity on project numbers and a project’s 
environmental additionality9
 Project based additionality testing investigates each individual project on a case-by-
case basis. It contains, mainly, legal and regulatory additionality test (regulatory surplus), 
investment test, barriers test, and common practice test
 
10
                                                            
9  Taken from Ellis and Bosi (1999) 
10  These are common used tests to investigate the additionality of activities. While some project based 
mechanisms are demanding more tests to assess the activities, some mechanisms look for just some of these 
tests.   
. Legal and regulatory additionality 
test investigates that whether the project is implemented to fulfill any compliance (official 
policies, regulations, or industry standards) or to make an additional emission reduction 
compared to case BAU.  In case the test result shows the second option, the project can be 
additional, but the project needs to be confirmed by other tests as well. Investment test 
judge a project as additional if the project is not implemented because it is a profitable 
project. Barrier test is designed to test implementation barriers, such as local resistance, lack 
of know-how, institutional barriers, etc. The project is considered additional according to 
this test, if the project succeeds in overcoming significant non-financial barriers that the 
business-as-usual alternative would not have had to face (WWF 2008). Common practice 
test assess a project non-additional if the technology used in project is a commonly used 
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technology. It is expected that while emission reduction is undertaken, the project should 
also serve as an urge to find new emission reduction technology. The main issue with project 
based approach is that the determination whether a project is additional can be quite 
subjective. 
 Instead of investigating each individual project case-by-case to determine 
additionality, performance standards approach establishes a threshold for technologies or 
processes. In contrast to the first approach, this approach has a lower transaction cost for 
project developers and contains simpler procedures. Standards are developed and/or 
approved by international organizations. Establishing a standard for projects requires 
comprehensive data collection and verification, and also regular updates. As a result of 
establishing threshold procedure, another contrast to project based approach is that in this 
approach much of the administrative burden shifts from project developers to international 
organizations. Performance standards contain benchmark approaches and positive 
technology lists.  Benchmark approaches establish a generic baseline scenario –referred to 
as benchmark- against which all projects of a given type are assessed (WWF 2008). If a 
project’s emission is lower than the pre-defined baseline it is presumed additional and 
offsets are awarded based on the difference between the project emission rate and the 
benchmark emission rate. Positive technology lists simply define which technologies can be 
considered additional in a certain region. Although performance standards approach is more 
transparent and reduces the administrative burden of project developer’s, the main problem 
related to this approach is that it may be too simple and broad (WWF 2008). 
III. PROJECT BOUNDARIES, LEAKAGE, AND PERMANENCE  
 In order to calculate the emission reduction of a project accurately, every project has 
to define its “monitoring plan”, which implies project boundaries, including physical, legal, 
and organizational boundaries. This boundaries restrict what needs to be monitored and 
also it is a crucial point to determine which baseline suits to the project. Furthermore, how a 
project boundary is defined is also important, because it influences the environmental 
credibility of credits generated by the project and the costs of monitoring (through the effect 
of project boundary definitions on the number of sources that need monitoring) (Ellis 2002). 
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 While projects achieve primary emission reduction targets, they may cause 
unintentionally emission increases out of the project’s boundaries. This effect, Leakage, is of 
particular concern in LULUCF (Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry) projects, which is a 
biological sequestration project type. Another issue particularly related with LULUCF is 
permanence, which refers to the length of time that carbon will remain stored after being 
sequestered in vegetation. Forests can easily be destroyed by natural events such as fire, 
pests, or disease, or by illegal logging or burning. LULUCF projects can therefore only 
temporarily sequester carbon from the atmosphere (WWF 2008). 
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3. IMPLICATIONS OF EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS 
 In 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act introduced an approach to reducing acid pollution. United 
States decided to use a market based cap and trade approach to reduce acid rain by 
reducing emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) emissions. The 
program launched in 1995 (Phase I) and in 2000 started second phase. The success of this 
program stipulated policy-makers considering trading-based instruments as part of the 
solution address other environmental problems (Bosi and Bygrave 2004). After adaptation of 
Kyoto Protocol, emission trading schemes became one of the widely used instrument among 
emission reduction methods as well as project based mechanisms. In this section I elaborate 
the most important emission trading schemes and also project based mechanisms. Among 
all emission trading schemes and project based mechanisms, this section particularly studies 
the Kyoto Protocol’s three “flexibility mechanisms”.    
a. CURRENTLY OPERATING CAP AND TRADE SYSTEMS 
I. EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSION TRADING SCHEME 
PHASE I   2005-2007 
 First phase of the European Union’s emission trading scheme (EU ETS) commenced 
operation on 1 January 2005 and expired on 31 December 2007. The EU ETS is the largest 
multi-country, multi-sector Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme worldwide since it has 
been established11. During Phase I more than 10,500 industrial installations were covered by 
the EU ETS, representing approximately 40 percent of the EU’s CO2 emissions, in 25 
European countries12
 The EU Directive applied on combustion of fuels in installations with a total rated 
thermal input exceeding 20 megawatt (except in installations for the incineration of 
. On 1 January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania became European Union’s 
new members and these countries were included in EU ETS. Therefore, EU ETS completed 
first phase with 27 participant countries. 
                                                            
11  European Commission (2005) 
12  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,  the United Kingdom. 
 24 
hazardous or municipal waste), such as industrial power stations, furnaces and other plants 
in the chemical industry, the ceramics industry, oil refineries, steel smeltering in the 
manufacturing industry, and the cellulose, paper and board manufacturing industries 
(Wagner 2004).  
 First Phase, covered only CO2, is often called as “learning phase”, “warm up phase” or 
“pilot phase” and was considered as a pilot project for Phase II, in which Kyoto Parties 
should reduce their emissions according to their Kyoto commitments. From 2005, Member 
States were allowed to opt-in installations that are carrying out activities listed in the 
Directive, but which are below the threshold size for automatic entry to the scheme. 
Conversely, the EU-ETS allowed Member States (MS) to opt-out installations for the first 
trading period, up to the end of 2007 (Blyth and Bosi 2004).  
 Saving unused emission allowances for future (banking) and using emission 
allowances from future allocations in current period (borrowing) were only allowed intra-
period for pilot phase and companies were prohibited, therefore, from transferring their 
unused first phase emission allowances to the second phase (2008-2012). Through European 
Union’s Linking Directive, EU ETS participants were allowed to use the credits from Clean 
Development Mechanism, Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), in meeting their compliance 
obligations. European Commission also specified non-compliance penalty as 40€ per one 
metric tonne of CO2-equivalent emitted over the allowance.       
PHASE II  2008-2012 
 On 1 January 2008 started the second phase of the EU ETS and it will end on 31 
December 2012. This phase corresponds to the first commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The European Commission has tightened the regulations of this period in order to 
meet Kyoto Protocol reduction targets. On 1 January 2008, three non-European Union 
countries were included in the EU ETS, Liechtenstein, Iceland, and Norway.  
 Beside CER credits, in the second phase, Kyoto parties are allowed to use Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs), which are generated via Joint Implementation (JI) projects, in order 
to comply with their emission reduction targets. Another different approach in Phase II in 
comparison with Phase I is on banking. Beginning with Phase II, the unused CERs and ERUs 
issued before 2013 will be valid for exchange with Phase III allowances until March 31, 2015. 
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The EU ETS allows Member States (MS) to opt-in, from 2008, activities, installations, and 
greenhouse gases which are not listed in the Directive, but there is no opt-out allowed for 
the second period (Blyth and Bosi 2004). Starting in 2008, the EU Trading Directive does 
allow Member States to include other installations and Greenhouse Gases, which are not 
covered by EU ETS, provided these have been approved by the Commission (Blyth and Bosi 
2004). Also Commission increased the penalty of non-compliance so that participants try 
harder to comply with directive requirements. The excess emissions penalty was increased 
to 100€ for each tonne of CO2-equivalent emitted over the allowance.  
 Norwegian Emission Trading System was launched at the same time as the EU ETS. 
This system linked to the EU ETS in Phase II and Norway ETS adopted the EU ETS Directive 
with a few adaptations.  
Table 3: EU ETS at a Glance Volumes & Values 2005-2008 
  European Union’ Emission Trading Scheme at a Glance Volumes & Values 2005-2009 
                    
    Volume    year to year  Value   year to year  
    (MtCO2e)   growth rate MUS $   growth rate 
                    
2005   322,01     —   8.220     —   
2006   1.104   243%   24.436   197%   
2007   2.060   87%   49.065   105%   
2008   3.093   50%   91.910   87%   
 
II. CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE  
 The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) launched in 2003. The CCX operates in North 
America and it covers all six GHGs. Members make a voluntary but legally binding 
commitment to meet annual GHG emission reduction targets. As stated in the CCX directive, 
in Phase I (2003-2006) members committed to reducing emissions a minimum of 1% per 
year, for a total reduction of 4% below average of annual emissions from 1998-2001. In 
Phase II (2007-2010), CCX members commit to a reduction schedule that requires year 2010 
emission reductions of 6% below baseline, average of annual emissions from 1998-2001 or 
the single year 2000, at minimum13
                                                            
13  Chicago Climate Exchange (2008) 
. The CCX allows participants to use credits generated 
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from offset projects, but only in countries and sectors specified by Chicago Climate Exchange 
Directive and also CER credits. This cap and trade system covers many different sectors such 
as transportation, aerospace, automotive, chemicals, technology, electric power generation 
and also universities, states, and municipalities.    
III. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 
 In 2005, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is established by seven 
northeastern U.S. states14 as the first mandatory cap and trade program in the United States 
to reduce GHG emissions. Subsequently three more states15 joined to this initiative. The 
RGGI covers CO2 emissions from power sector, and the target is a 10% reduction in these ten 
states’ emissions by 2018. The first three year compliance period had begun on January 
2009. Although banking of unused allowances is allowed with no restrictions, borrowing is 
not allowed. Initiative also approve project based emission reductions outside the capped 
sector. The following types of projects are eligible there under16
IV. NEW SOUTH WALES GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION SCHEME 
: 
• Landfill methane capture and destruction; 
• Reduction in emissions of sulphur hexafluoride (SF6); 
• Sequestration of carbon due to afforestation; 
• Reduction or avoidance of CO2 emissions from natural gas, oil or propane end-use 
combustion due to end-use energy efficiency; and 
• Avoided methane emissions from agricultural manure management operations. 
 Initially New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme is established by 
Australian Government as a voluntary scheme which launched in 1997. The scheme’s name 
later is changed to New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (NSW GGAS) and it 
                                                            
14  Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont  
15  Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island 
16  RGGI (October 2007; p.9) 
 27 
became mandatory on 1 January 2003. It covers state’s electricity sector. The NSW GGAS 
establishes an annual state-wide per capita GHG emission target for the electricity sector to 
meet Kyoto Protocol GHG emission reduction targets. The scheme’s initial target was 8.65 
metric tonne of CO2 equivalent per capita in 2003 and the target was reduced steadily each 
year to 7.27 tonne of CO2 equivalent per capita in 2007 and this target will remain at this 
level till 2012. This target is also 5% below the Kyoto Protocol baseline year 1989-1990. 
Participants are electricity retailers but also include some generators who sell electricity 
directly to customers (IPART 2007). Two types of offset are allowed; NSW GHG Abatement 
Certificates (NGACs) and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs). The penalty of non-
compliance is specified as 12.50 AU$ per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2-e). 
V. SWISS EMISSION TRADING SCHEME 
 The Swiss Federal Council introduced a tax on carbon dioxide emissions, which 
became mandatory in 2008 and also Swiss Emission Trading Scheme (Schweizer 
Emissionshandelssystem, Swiss ETS) entered into force on 1 January 2008. The scheme 
enables participants to avoid the CO2 tax. The Swiss Emission Trading Scheme covers energy 
intensive sectors such as cement, paper and pulp, glass and ceramics industries. The project 
based flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, CDM and JI, are allowed to be used as 
supplemental to national regulations. Swiss government aims at linking the scheme to EU 
ETS in a later date. There is a substantial difference between these two Emission Trading 
Schemes concerning the penalization of non-compliance. In the event of non-compliance, 
participants in Swiss ETS have to pay the CO2 tax, which ranges from Swiss Frank 12 to 36 per 
tonne of CO2 emitted beyond the allowance. The penalty in case of non-compliance in EU 
ETS is 100€ per tonne of CO2 emitted beyond the allowance.   
VI. JAPAN’S VOLUNTARY EMISSION TRADING SCHEME 
 As of May 2005, first Japanese “cap and trade” scheme, Japan’s Voluntary Emission 
Trading Scheme (JVETS), promoted by the Ministry of the Environment, Japan (MOEJ). 
Voluntary participants commit to emission reductions (annual basis/CO2 only). The first 
commitment period started in April 2006 and concluded in March 2007. Corporations may 
receive subsidies within the scheme to help fund investment in energy efficiency 
improvements or other equipment to meet reduction targets (Subsidy rate is up 1/3 of 
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installation costs, max. 200 million yen per site)17. In case the reduction target cannot be 
met, participant has to pay received subsidies back. The JVETS allows participants to use 
CERs from CDM projects and ERUs from JI projects in order to comply with their 
obligations18
Table 4: Current Cap and Trade Programs at a Glance, Volumes & Values in 2007-08 
. The fourth Phase of the JVETS started in April 2009 and will end in March 
2010.  
 
    Allowances Markets       
  Volume   Value   Volume   Value 
  (MtCO2e)   (MUS$)   (MtCO2e)   (MUS$) 
EU ETS 2.060   49.065   3093   91910 
Chicago Climate Exchange 23   72   69   309 
New South Wales 25   224   31   183 
RGGI NA   NA   65   246 
AAUs NA   NA   18   211 
                
TOTAL 2.108   49.361   3.276   92.859 
 
VII. PROPOSED EMISSION TRADING SCHEMES 
 The Government of Canada released a framework for regulating air emissions on 26 
April 2007. In this framework a proposed emission trading scheme was outlined for GHG 
emissions and air pollutants19. The Government plans to launch the ETS in 2010, which 
would be a baseline-and-credit system20
                                                            
17  UNDP, Human Development Report 2007 – mitigation country studies, Japan – Country Study 
18  SUDO, Tomonori,  US-Japan Workshop on Climate actions and Co-benefit March 22-23, 2006 
19  The report can be downloaded at: http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/media/m_124/report_eng.pdf. 
20  In a baseline-and-credit emissions trading system, a baseline is set. In this case, the baseline would be 
the emissions-intensity target. Facilities that reduced emissions below their target would be allocated tradable 
credits that they could either bank for a future compliance obligation 
, not cap and trade system. According to this plan, 
the system would target GHG emissions from Canada’s major industrial sectors, which 
together account for about half of Canada’s GHG emissions (Jaffe and Stavins 2007). 
 or sell to another facility. Facilities that emitted above their target would have to buy credits from other 
facilities or use their own banked credits to meet their regulatory obligation (King 2007). 
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 Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) will come into force in 2011 as the 
primary mechanism for reducing GHG emissions of Australia. The Scheme will cover only 
domestic emission sources and sinks that are counted in Australia’s Kyoto Protocol emissions 
account. Agriculture emissions will be excluded. In addition, the Australian Government will 
stipulate voluntary market offsets.  
 In North America, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Manitoba, Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin agreed to establishing Western Climate Initiative and Midwestern Greenhouse 
Gas Reduction Accord (MGGA) on 15 November 2007. This system will cover all six GHGs. 
The first compliance period will begin on 1 January 2012. Another proposed program is 
Western Climate Initiative (WCI), which includes some states of U.S. and Canada21
 
. The 
scheme will come into force fully in 2015, and it will cover almost 90% of GHG emissions in 
WCI Partner states and provinces, including those from electricity, industry, transportation, 
and residential and commercial fuel use. 
 The U.S. Senate approved the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES) 
on 26 June 2009. It is an energy bill to establish variant cap and trade systems. This 
legislation will cover over the period 2012-2050.      
                                                            
21  Arizona (USA), California (USA), New Mexico (USA), Oregon(USA), Washington (USA), Utah (USA), 
Montana (USA), British Columbia (Can), Manitoba (Can), Ontario (Can), and Quebec (Can) 
 Table 5: Key Characteristics of Current Cap and Trade Schemes (1) 
 Eligible 
Gases 
Sources Voluntary 
(V) or 
Mandator
y (M)? 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
 Target: 
Fixed (F) 
or Indexed 
(I)? 
Ti
m
e 
Sc
al
e 
Non-compliance 
Penalty 
Use of offsets Banking Unit 
EU ETS 
Phase I 
CO2 Combustion plants, oil 
refineries, coke ovens, I&S, 
cement, glass, lime, brick, 
ceramics, pulp and paper 
M Emitters F 2005-2007 40€ CDM (excluding 
forestry) 
Intra-
period 
1 metric 
tonne of 
CO2- eq 
EU ETS  
Phase II 
 
 
CO2+ opt 
in 
Phase I+ possible opt in for 
some sectors/gases 
M Emitters F 2008-2012 100€ CDM (excluding 
forestry) and JI 
Yes 1 metric 
tonne of 
CO2- eq 
Chicago 
Climate 
Exchange 
6 GHG Electricity generation, 
manufacturing industry 
V Emitters 
and 
offset 
providers 
F Phase I:  
2003-2006 
Phase II:  
2007-2012 
No defined 
penalty22
CDM and 
projects in 
countries and 
sectors specified 
by Scheme 
 
Yes 100 metric 
tonnes of 
CO2- eq 
                                                            
22  Although there are no defined penalties yet in CCX, there are some penalty propositions. 
 Table 6: Key Characteristics of Current Cap and Trade Schemes (2) 
Regional 
Greenhouse 
Gas 
Initiative 
CO2 Power Sector Only M Emitters F 2009-2018 Will be enforced 
according to each 
State’s prevailing 
enforcement 
methods 
Yes (specified 
projects) 
Yes 1 short 
tonne 
 CO2- eq 
New South 
Wales 
Greenhouse 
Gas Scheme 
6 GHG Production and use of 
electricity 
M Electricity 
retailers, 
large 
electricity 
users 
I 2003-2020 12.50 AU$ per 
tonne of CO2-eq 
Yes (specified 
project types23
Yes 
) 
1 metric 
tonne of 
CO2- eq 
Swiss 
Emission 
Trading 
Scheme 
CO2 Cement, I&S, aluminium,pulp 
and paper, glass, ceramics, 
other industry 
V           
(but 
legally 
binding) 
Emitters F 2008-2012 CO2 tax since 
exemption+ 
interest 
CDM and JI Yes 1 metric 
tonne of 
CO2- eq 
Japan’s 
Voluntary 
Emissions 
Trading 
Scheme 
CO2 Industry: food, breweries, 
pulp chemicals 
V Emitters  F Phase I: 
2006-2007 
II:2007-2008 
III:2008-2009 
IV:2009-2010 
Return of subsidy , 
"naming and 
shaming24
CDM and JI 
" 
Yes 1 metric 
tonne of 
CO2- eq 
                                                            
23  NSW GHG Abatement Certificates (NGACs) and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) 
24  Ellis and Tirpak, 2006 
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“Offsets are an imaginary commodity created by deducting what you hope happens from what you 
guess would have happened.” (Dan Welch quoted in The Guardian, June 16 2007) 
b. EXISTING PROJECT-BASED MECHANISMS 
 
Table 7: Project-Based Transactions at a Glance Volumes & Values 2004-2008 
 
I. CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 
 The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the Kyoto Protocol’s three 
“flexibility mechanism” and also widely used project-based mechanism. This mechanism 
enables Parties to use credits generated from the projects in developing countries that 
ratified the Protocol, but are not among the Annex I countries subject to the Protocol’s 
emission limitation commitments (IETA 2007). The CDM credits may be generated from 
                                                            
25  “M” refers to million. 
  Project Based Transactions at a Glance Volumes & Values 2004-200825      
    2004     2005     2006   
    Volume  Value   Volume  Value   Volume  Value 
    (MtCO2e) MUS $   (MtCO2e) MUS $   (MtCO2e) MUS $ 
                    
CDM   97 485,01   346,15 2.544,30   537 5.804 
JI   9,10 54,19   17,78 82,41   16 141 
Other Compliance & 2,92 5,57   6,05 43,03   33 146 
Voluntary 
Transactions                 
                    
TOTAL   109,99 549,16   374,34 2.708,34   586 6.091 
                    
    2007 
  
2008 
 
      
    Volume Value 
 
Volume Value       
    (MtCO2e) MUS $ 
 
(MtCO2e) MUS $       
                    
CDM   551 7.426   389 6.519       
JI   41 499   20 294       
Other Compliance & 42 265   54 397       
Voluntary 
Transactions                 
                    
TOTAL   634 8.190   463 7.210       
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emission reduction projects or from afforestation and reforestation projects. The credits 
generated via the CDM projects are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).  One CER 
credit is  equivalent to one tonne of CO2-e emission reductions. As Protocol introduced the 
CDM under the Article 12, the purpose of CDM is; i) to assist Parties not included in Annex I 
in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the 
Convention, and ii) to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments26. While the developing 
countries continue to develop in a sustainable manner, combating poverty and, at the same 
time, through the CDM projects contribute to the global effort to mitigate the greenhouse 
effect27. 
 
Graph 4: CDM Project Cycle28
 The CDM projects can be implemented in the scopes as follows; end-use energy 
efficiency improvement, supply-side energy efficiency improvement, renewable energy, fuel 
 
                                                            
26  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 12/2. 
27  UNCTAD Climate Change Programme, The Clean Development Mechanism Guide- 2009. 
28  taken from UNCTAD Climate Change Programme, The Clean Development Mechanism Guide- 2009. 
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switching, agriculture, industrial processes, solvent and other product use, waste 
management, sinks (only afforestation and reforestation). In order to earn the CERs credits, a 
CDM project must satisfy the conditions specified by Protocol;         
 (Protocol Article 12/ 3a) The project activity be undertaken in a non-Annex I country 
(i.e. a developing country) that is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol. 
 (Protocol Article 12/5a) Participation should be voluntarily and should be approved 
by the non-Annex I Host Country and any Annex I Party involved in the project. 
 (Protocol Article 12/5b) The result of the emission reduction should be real, 
measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change. 
 (Protocol Article 12/5c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would 
occur in the absence of the certified project activity. 
 There are four institutions to be mentioned in the process of generating a CER credit, 
which begins with preparation of the Project Design Document (PDD) addressed to Designed 
National Authority. The PDD contains the title of the Project, aim of the Project,  description 
and details of the Project, and Project Participants. The Institutions authorized on this 
process are  COP/MOP (Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol), CDM Executive Board, Designated National Authorities (DNAs), and 
Designated Operational Entities (DOEs). Each Party involved in a CDM project has to 
establish the Designated National Authority (DNA), which should justify the voluntary nature 
of the involvement of the project participants and in the case of the host Party, attest that 
the project activities contribute to that country’s sustainable development29. The Designated 
Operational Entity validates and subsequently requests registration of a proposed CDM 
project activity which will be considered valid after 8 weeks if no request for review was 
made. Also  the DOE verifies emission reduction of a registered CDM project activity30
                                                            
29  UNCTAD Climate Change Programme, The Clean Development Mechanism Guide- 2009. 
. The 
CDM Executive Board, which operates under the authority of the Parties and guidance of 
COP/MOP, is responsible for supervising the functioning of the CDM as well as for approving 
new methodologies, for the accreditation of the DOEs, for registration of the CDM projects, 
30  UNFCCC website;  http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/index.html viewed on 08.12.2009 
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and for issuing CERs. Issuing CER credit means that the Project has implemented the 
requirements mentioned above. The COP/MOP is the institution with authority over CDM 
and its guidelines.   
 
Graph 5: Percentage of CDM projects in each category (UNEP RISOE 2009) 
 While CERs can be used by Annex I countries to meet their Kyoto reduction target, 
they might also be used by Parties under different emission trading schemes. To date China 
has the biggest share as the host country for registered CDM projects with 35%, projects in 
India account for 25% and Brazil hosted 9% of all registered CDM projects (UNFCCC 2009). 
These statistics indicates that the CDM projects does not spread uniformly. It intensifies 
especially in Asian countries (75%) and Latin America countries (23%). Renewable energy 
rank first among all applied CDM project types with 60%. Although HFCs, PFCs and N2O 
reduction has just two percent among all applied CDM projects, these projects has earned 
77% of all generated CERs (UNEP RISOE 2009). It is based on the properties of HFC gases. 
HFC-22, a gas widely used as a refrigerant, emits HFC-23. HFC-23  has 11,700 times the 
global warming potential (GWP) of CO2. Subject to this fact, one tonne of HFC-23 reduction is 
equal to 11,700 tonne of CO2-e reduction (Cosbey et al. 2007). Also N2O has 310 times the 
GWP of CO2.       
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Graph 6: CERs issued in each sector (UNEP RISOE 2009) 
 
II. JOINT IMPLEMENTATION 
 The second project-based mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, which aims at reducing 
anthropogenic GHGs, is the Joint Implementation. As defined in Article 6 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, it allows to Annex B countries (Parties committed to  limit or reduce their emission 
under the Kyoto Protocol) to earn credits from an emission reduction project or emission 
removal project in another Annex B country. The credits earned from the Joint 
Implementation projects called as “Emission Reduction Units” (ERUs). Each ERU is equivalent 
to one tonne of CO2 and can be used in achieving the Kyoto commitments.  
 Participants might carry out projects to acquire CERs in following scopes; energy 
industries (renewable/non-renewable sources), energy distribution, energy demand, 
manufacturing industries, chemical industry, construction, transport, mining/mineral 
production, metal production, fugitive emissions from fuels (solid, oil, and gas), fugitive 
emissions from production and consumption of halocarbons and sulphur, hexafluoride, 
solvents use, waste handling and disposal, land-use, land-use change and forestry, and 
agriculture. Land-use, land-use change and forestry is the only different scope from CDM’s 
sectoral scope list. 
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To illustrate, suppose the Kyoto Protocol only had three Annex I parties, countries A, B 
and C, each having 100 AAUs for the whole first commitment period. This would mean 
that the total amount of credits at the beginning of the first commitment period would be 
equal to 300. Now suppose that A hosted a JI project for B, resulting in 10 credits-worth of 
emissions reductions. A would have to convert 10 of its AAUs to ERUs and transfer them 
to B. So in the end, A would have ten less credits, or 90 AAUs (100 AAUs minus 10 
converted ERUs); B would have ten more credits (100 AAUs plus 10 ERUs from the 
project), and country C would remain with its 100 AAUs. The total number of credits at 
the end of the first commitment period would be the same -- 300. 
Figure 3: Illustration of Joint Implemenatation Procedure 
 Joint Implementation, like CDM, requires establishing of Institutions in national level 
as well as international level (under UNFCCC). The COP/MOP is the institution over the JI and 
its guidelines. Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC) was established Under the 
authority and guidance of the COP/MOP. The JISC supervises the verification procedure of 
ERUs. In pursuant with the guidelines of the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the JISC accredits independent entities (IE) responsible for making determinations 
regarding project design documents (PDDs) and determinations of reported greenhouse gas 
emission reductions or enhancements of removals regarding JI projects that are processed in 
accordance with the verification31
 It is ratified to the Kyoto Protocol and its assigned amount has been calculated and 
recorded  
. One of the requirements for a party involved in a JI 
project is designing Designated Focal Point (DFP). DFP is the authorized entity from Joint 
Implementation projects on national level. The DFP is responsible for guiding and for 
preparing the necessary requirements for installations involved projects.  
 There are two different verification procedure according to the host country’s 
compliance with requirements. The JI project is assessed under Track 1, in case it fulfills the 
following requirements (eligibility requirements); 
                                                            
31  UNFCCC/CCNUCC Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee P-JI-ACCR-02 
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 It has in place a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and anthropogenic removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol 
 It has a national registry system for estimating emissions/removals 
 It has submitted annually the most recent required inventory 
 It submits the supplementary information on assigned amount in accordance 
  
Graph 7: Joint Implementation Project Cycle 
 According to Article 23 of the JI Guidelines, if the host country meets all requirements 
above, it may verify reductions in GHGs and may also issue the appropriate ERUs. If the host 
country fulfills only the first two requirements, Track 2 procedure is followed. This procedure 
is similar to CDM procedure, it needs approval and monitoring of international institutes. 
Under Track 2 process the JISC assesses projects. After projects are approved according to JI 
Guidelines, the host country may issue and transfer ERUs to non host country (investor 
country).  
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 After verification of ERUs, verification reports are submitted to the host and investor 
country’s DFP. The host country converts a specified amount AAUs (assigned amount units) 
into ERUs. Finally, the host country transfers ERUs from its national registry to investor 
country’s national registry.  
 
Graph 8: Number (%) of Joint Implementation Projects in each category (UNEP RISOE 2009) 
 Joint Implementation mechanism covers less country than Clean Development 
Mechanism, as a result so far there are less projects implemented in JI and also less one 
metric tonne of CO2-e credits earned compared to CDM. Another reason is that the credits 
generated via JI projects can be used only since 2008 in complying with Protocol reduction 
targets. Graph 4 indicates most used project type as CH4, cement, coal mine/bed project 
types (37%). Renewable energy is the second widely used project type (29%) and most used 
renewable energy project types are; wind, biomass energy, new hydro power plants. After 
renewable energy, energy efficiency (18%) and HFCs, PFCs and N2O reductions (11%) have 
important shares among all project types. In comparing with CDM, projects in HFCs, PFCs 
and N2O reduction or removals by sinks generate one less metric tonne of CO2-equivalent 
than CDM does. Eastern Europe countries are the most preferred host countries. Russia and 
Ukraine host 75% of all JI projects. Up to now 73% of applied JI projects assessed under 
Track 2. This issue arises from Russia, which is not in compliance with the institutional 
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol.   
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Graph 9: Annual ERUs from Joint Implementation projects 
 
III. DOMESTIC OFFSET PROGRAMS 
 Beside mostly used CDM and JI, there are some offset programs generating credits, 
which can be used in a supplemental manner to commit emission reduction targets under 
different market based emission trading schemes. Under NSW GGAS, participants can use NSW 
Greenhouse Abatement Certificates, and Renewable Energy Certificates. RGGI and other cap and 
trade systems, which allow to use emission reduction credits to meet the target of the program, has 
established a set of project types. The scopes, sectors and the areas, where can the project could be 
implemented, determined by the Directives.     
IV. VERIFIED (VOLUNTARY) EMISSION REDUCTION 
 The credits generated from the voluntary projects accrued in a country outside the 
Kyoto Protocol compliance regime are called Verified (voluntary) Emission Reduction Credits 
(VERs). The main drivers of such projects can be ordered as follows; 
 Entities anticipate being included in Kyoto Protocol in a future time and therefore 
want to gain experience before compliance period began. 
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 Entities, who buy the credits, may want to be carbon neutral. This implementation 
can also be to show the buyer entity's socially-responsible image (e.g. BBC, HSBC, 
Marks&Spencer, Tesco). 
 Some big organizations, like FIFA 2006 World Cup also 2010 FIFA World Cup, either 
buy VER credits to offset their total carbon footprints during organization (including the 
emission of travel of the participants) or invest emission reduction projects, which supply 
VER credits. 
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4. LINKING CAP AND TRADE SCHEME WITH PROJECT 
BASED MECHANISM 
a. WHAT IS LINKING? 
 The situation, when the regulatory authority of an cap and trade scheme allows 
participants to use allowances from another cap and trade scheme or credits generated 
from project based mechanism to meet compliance obligations of a system, is called linking. 
Linking emissions trading systems can satisfy a market with a larger number of participants, 
enhance abatement options, provide market liquidity, diversify control costs, which should 
reduce the total compliance cost and so improve economic efficiency (Haites and Mullins 
2001, Jaffe and Stavins 2007). The latter potential benefit of linking meets with the main 
idea of emissions trading: to reduce the cost of achieving a given emissions target. 
b. TYPES OF LINKAGE 
 
 
Graph 10: Types of Linkages 
 Type of linkage can take variety of forms regarding the nature of the link. Basically, 
linkages could be examined under two groups, direct and indirect linkages. Also direct 
linkage can be examined under one-way (unilateral) and two-way (bilateral or multilateral) 
approaches. Direct linkage occurs when at least one of the two or more tradable permit 
systems accept to use other system’s (or systems’) units in compliance in its own system. 
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Even if neither system recognizes other system’s allowance unit and these systems link to 
each other with a third mutual system, this linkage is called indirect linkage.  
Direct linkage is divided into three different types.  
Direct one-way linkage; it occurs when participants of system A can purchase and use 
allowances from system B for compliance but not vice versa. The linking  Clean Development 
Mechanism to EU ETS is an significant example for such a linkage. The credits generated via 
CDM or JI projects can be used in compliance with EU’s ETS targets.  
Direct two-way (bilateral or multilateral) linkage; if the tradable permit systems recognize 
each other’s allowances in order to comply with its own target, such linkages are called 
direct two way linkage. Such a linkage can contain more than two systems. Several national 
cap and trade schemes under the EU ETS have this type of linkage. 
Direct bilateral or multilateral link channeled through an intermediary; Markets could be 
linked via an intermediary (e.g. government). In such a case, if a firm (X) under system A 
wants to sell allowances to a firm (Y) under system B, that firm (X) should give a respective 
amount of allowances to its government, and government will convert this amount to 
assigned amount allowances (AAU) and will deliver this AAUs to the government of scheme 
B. After converting this AAUs to its national allowance unit, the government of scheme B will 
deliver the allowances to firm (Y).   
 One restriction on linking can be that regulatory authority can limit the amount of 
transferable unit between different schemes. Another restriction can be in unit of 
allowances. Participants in a system may be allowed unrestricted use of another system’s 
allowances, but an “exchange rate” might be applied to their use. That is, participants could 
be required to surrender a different number of another system’s allowances to cover each 
tonne of their emissions than would be the case if they used their own system’s allowances 
(Jaffe and Stavins 2007).   
 Indirect linkage occurs even if neither system recognizes the other system’s 
allowance unit, in this situation these systems can be still linked indirectly through a direct 
link that each system recognizes a third common system. Most of the cap and trade schemes 
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allow participants to use offset credits earned from CDM projects. This kind of linkage make 
the schemes indirectly linked. 
c. BENEFITS OF LINKING CAP AND TRADE SCHEME WITH PROJECT 
BASED MECHANISM 
 Credits generated via project based mechanism could be used under cap and trade 
scheme in compliance with scheme's air pollution reduction target, but not vice versa. Such 
a linking is an example to direct one way linkage. This type of linkage can offer participants 
opportunities to comply with reduction targets and also satisfy sustainable development for 
host countries. The implementation of project based mechanism can be seen in the sense 
that in the atmosphere a tonne of carbon dioxide emission has same effect wherever it is. It 
does not matter the emission reduction project has been carried out in a country under 
scheme or outside of the scheme’s scope considering air pollution.  
 The very first benefit of such a linking is that it may stimulate the entities to use 
project based mechanism more often and to develop project activities, as in the case EU ETS, 
including CDM and JI will provide an important boost to the use of these instruments (No.5, 
Emissions Trading Policy Briefs, 2003).  In doing so, the entities related to cap and trade 
scheme may take advantages from the benefits explained below;  
More Compliance Options and Lower Cost for Companies; 
 Linking between cap and trade scheme and project based mechanism may satisfy 
lower cost compliance. Project based mechanism, basically, takes advantage of different 
marginal abatement costs across countries/regions by broadening range of the emission 
reduction options. If private entities (project developers) under a cap and trade scheme are 
allowed to use project based mechanisms, these entities may find countries/regions with 
lower marginal abatement costs and earn some credits from implemented projects in that 
country/region. 
Rising Liquidity and Reducing Prices; 
 Credits generated from project based mechanism rise the liquidity of allowances in a 
cap and trade scheme’s market. Larger markets are more effective. The increasing 
 45 
allowances reduce the price of emission allowance unit and entities,  therefore, could 
maintain emission reduction obligations with a lower cost.  
Stimulus to New Sectors and Mitigation Methods; 
 Implemented emissions reduction projects could provide valuable information about 
non-capped sectors by a cap and trade scheme. Some sectors may be suitable for cap and 
trade scheme in the near future, or can be used as offsets in a cap and trade scheme 
(Government of Canada 2003). Also through projects, firms could implement new mitigation 
methods, which could encourage technological improvements.  
 In case, cap and trade scheme only covers CO2, project based activities can provide to 
non-CO2 GHG emissions reductions (Sorrell and Smith 2002). Project based mechanism could 
also identify other potential areas for emission reductions that are currently not well known 
(Government of Canada 2003). 
Enabling Technology Transfer32
Contribution to Host Countries’  Sustainable Development
; 
 The projects like CDM, which can be implemented in developing countries or in 
under-developed countries, introduce high emission reduction technologies to the host 
countries from advanced countries. The host countries, which will undergo Kyoto obligations 
in near future, gain also experiences via high technology including projects and by virtue of 
the new mitigation technology they will meet relatively easier with reduction targets in case 
they are included under any scheme in near future. 
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 The developing countries emit in high volumes of emissions while they are trying to 
have a rapid economic development, and it is not easy to control the national emission level 
for a country struggling with immediate development concerns. The installations with low 
 
                                                            
32  In its Special Report on Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines technology transfer “as a broad set of processes 
covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change 
amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and research/education institutions”.  (IPCC, 2000, p. 3.) 
33  Sustainable Development; development that meets the needs for the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. 
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mitigation technologies can mitigate their emissions via project based mechanism. By doing 
this, this projects serve to country’s economic, environmental, and social dimensional 
development. Well designed CDM projects can thus offer attractive opportunities for 
supporting development priorities of host countries as reflected in e.g. general national 
development plans, in sectoral or local environmental plans, and in social development 
strategies (UNEP RISOE, CDM Sustainable Development Impacts) . 
Stimulating Foreign Investment; 
 The concept of project based mechanism, bringing together an investor under the 
emission reduction obligation and a country with low marginal abatement cost, may ensure 
an opportunity to introduce local investors to foreign investors and foreign investors may 
investigate the host country according to their interest fields. 
d. ISSUES ON LINKING CAP AND TRADE SCHEME WITH PROJECT 
BASED MECHANISM 
 A well designed linkage between cap and trade scheme and project based 
mechanism could lead to many benefits in economic, technological and environmental 
terms. But these effects could be reversed if the required regulations are not implemented 
clearly to avoid issues rising from linking two systems.   
I. DOUBLE COUNTING 
 The key issue that the regulatory authority has to deal with while implementing 
linkage between project based mechanism and cap and trade scheme is double counting. 
Both environmental and financial benefits of emissions trading systems may  be 
compromised by double counting issue. It occurs, basically, when an emission reduction 
project's mitigation effort is assessed twice unintentionally. The project based activities are 
implemented in order to gain tradable emission reduction credits. But there is a risk that the 
project will also be used to fulfill other regulatory obligations, such as counting towards 
increases in renewable energy capacity. Such situations can lead to the double counting of 
emission reductions (Sorrell and Smith, 2002). It can also occur when two entities "earn 
tradable credit" for a single emission reduction or sequestration project, or when same 
entity claims an emission reduction or removal twice. There are two types of double 
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counting, direct and indirect. Briefly, direct double counting occurs if it arises from project 
activities which reduce or limit directly the emissions of an installation falling within the 
scope of the scheme and indirect double counting occurs if it arises from project activities 
which reduce or limit indirectly the emission level of installations falling within the scope of 
the scheme. Double counting may lead to increase liquidity in supply of credits, which causes 
to reduce of market prices and compliance cost, consequently these conditions lead to cause 
losing economical and environmental gains of cap and trade scheme.  
 Considering the fact that avoiding double counting is very crucial for a cap and trade 
scheme in terms of maintaining economical and environmental targets and benefits, 
sustaining these benefits of system requires clear rules and very careful monitoring 
processes. There are four main concepts which should be considered to avoid double 
counting issue; set-aside, determining appropriate project boundaries, differentiating 
capped sectors for project based mechanism from cap and trade scheme, and global registry 
tracking system.  
 Not well defined project boundaries may bring on double counting issue. For 
instance, a project may overlap two or more sectors and it is possible in this case that the 
emission reductions are claimed separately in each sector. Also projects may contain more 
than one installation, and in case of not well defined boundaries, each installation may claim 
the same emissions reduction credits. Moreover, some projects have inherent difficulties in 
monitoring the project data and this might result in double counting issue. The regulatory 
authority should determine the appropriate project boundaries to avoid double counting in 
such situations. Determining appropriate boundaries requires clearly identifying the 
ownership of the particular project that the entities who can claim emission credits from 
project, and the quantity of reduced emissions that can be attributable to the particular 
project. Project boundaries, therefore, are very crucial in terms of determination of the 
reduced emissions (direct/indirect) through a particular project,  not clearly defined project 
boundaries may lead to double counting or generating inadequate credits for that particular 
project. Those key sectors/projects where double counting issue is a potential problem 
should be identified by regulatory authority and new methodologies should be developed to 
identify and eliminate the issue. Ownership, controlling, calculation, estimation and 
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accounting issues should be considered in detail and determined clearly. Also if all entities 
use the same reporting approach this may help avoiding from double counting issue. 
 To date some institutes related with climate change and project based mechanisms 
guided project boundaries with their assessment reports and propositions. The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines project boundary for 
CDM and JI activities as "the project boundary shall encompass all anthropogenic emissions 
by sources of greenhouse gases under the control of the project participants that are 
significant and reasonably attributable to the CDM (or JI) project activity" 
(FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2, appendix B.para.4 and Annex G, para.52). Another proposal came 
from a collective work of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) 
and World Resources Institute (WRI), which proposes that a project boundary encompasses 
"all relevant primary and secondary effects that will be taken into account in the project 
calculation...(and) can include both direct and indirect effects" (draft WBCSD/WRI 2003). 
Primary effects refers to the specific GHG reducing activities intended to be achieved 
through the project and secondary effects refers to all other GHG emissions changes 
occurring as a result of activity, including leakage. WRI/WBCSD notes that if all reporting 
entities use the same approach there will be no double counting of direct emissions 
between two or more organizations. 
 Some cap and trade schemes can be linked indirectly, as mentioned earlier, via a 
project based mechanism. In such a situation, credits generated from a specific offset 
activity can be sold in each scheme. Obviously in the absence of proper regulations this 
brings on double counting issue. Such a situation can be avoided with a global registry 
system that tracks emission reductions. Each traded emissions reduction credit has to be 
tracked with a specific serial number ensuring that the serial numbers are retired once they 
are used.  
 Bosi and Bygrave (2004) elaborate double counting issue on a domestic basis and 
they state that separating the covered sectors by project based mechanism and cap and 
trade scheme and not allowing participants to generate project-based credits from activities 
covered by the trading scheme is an efficient way for avoiding double counting. They also 
stress that it does not mean that participants in a domestic trading scheme could not be 
involved in project based activities. Participants in a cap and trade scheme may be  involved 
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in activities which are not covered by the scheme, yet still could be eligible for crediting  
projects. Sorrell and Smith (2002) exemplify this situation in their work, which studied the 
UK trading scheme. Retail chains may want to propose project-based activities associated 
with transport, which was not covered by the UK trading scheme. Considering the statement 
of Bosi and Bygrave, the relation between covered sectors by cap and trade scheme and 
project based mechanism implies that while the scope of the cap and trade scheme expands, 
the scope of project based mechanism reduces. Sorrel and Smith propose in order to 
eliminate double counting concerns that "Projects that affect emissions from sources that 
are covered by the cap and trade program are ineligible for crediting" (Sorrell and Smith, 
2002). This proposal can be illustrated with power generation sector. If we assume power 
generation sector is capped by a cap and trade scheme, the proposal implies that not only 
power generation sector but also greenhouse gas emitting power generation sectors, such 
as renewable energy projects, should be excluded from project based mechanism's scope  
(Bosi and Bygrave, 2004). 
 While separating the scopes is an easy and efficient way to avoid double counting 
issue, cap and trade scheme and project based mechanism could include same scopes with 
appropriate regulations. A regulatory authority or government could keep a certain volume 
of the allowances and this helps avoiding double counting greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. Once the total allowance limit for a given sector, which is capped by cap and 
trade scheme, is defined (i.e. the total allowed greenhouse gas emission level for that sector) 
authority or government may assess the predicted or desired project activities and emission 
reductions related to the given sector. The assessment of the project activities may be 
adjusted according to approved and planned activities. By doing so, the total contribution of 
project based mechanism is subtracted from the total allowances for that sector and the 
double counting issue arising from linking two different schemes could be avoided. In 
theory, the quantity of credits earned through project based mechanism can reach up to the 
level of allowances set-aside for the project based mechanism. However, there could be 
flexibility to add project based credits to domestic allowances for a country with an overall 
greenhouse gas emission obligation (Bosi and Bygrave, 2004). This points out that the 
allowances set aside and credits achieved through project based activities may not be 
corresponding. In such a case, for example, if the credits earned from projects end up with 
greater volume than the allowances set aside for the projects, then other mitigation 
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measures and emissions purchases would be needed. On the other hand, if the allowances 
set aside for the project based activities are greater than the achieved emission reductions, 
then the extra allowances could be supplied to the trading market or banked for the future.  
 Even though linking two systems is technically possible, there are issues regulatory 
authorities should consider while implementing linkage. The relationship between project 
based mechanism and foreign investment has an important effect on that kind of a decision. 
Economic, political costs and benefits, design issues, and administrative costs are the issues 
which should be considered in detail before deciding the linkage. Bosi and Bygrave also 
concludes that combing a domestic cap and trade scheme and a project based mechanism in 
the same sector would likely involve more complexities and perhaps efficiency losses 
compared to a stand-alone domestic cap and trade scheme (Bosi and Bygrave, 2004).    
II. CREDITING ISSUE 
 A project activity should be certified in order to generate tradable credit. The volume 
of credits as a consequence of a project activity relies especially on determination of the 
terms; baseline, leakage, permanence, project boundary. How these terms are defined, 
calculated or estimated affect the environmental and economic impacts of the activity. 
Project credits should be issued ex-post (after reductions have been verified) in order to 
observe every factor (e.g. leakage, permanence) affecting quantity of credits and ex-ante 
crediting (forward crediting) should not be allowed. Nevertheless, some countries may want 
to observe the potential contribution from the projects which will be implemented within 
the country to comply with GHG targets. Countries may want to do this for planning 
purposes. Bosi and Bygrave (2002) state that there are two possible solutions. Countries, 
that have such an intention, could develop a separate database to track emission reductions 
from domestic projects, or through a special notification procedure to the national registry 
as a suitable check and balance of project emission reductions against the national emission 
inventory, as suggested by Begg et al. (2002). Although the separate database brings 
additional administration costs, if the expected activities are in large volumes it may be 
worth these costs.          
 In order to maintain the environmental and economic efficiency of emissions 
reduction system, the project owners under the countries with domestic GHG reduction 
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target have to surrender an equal amount of allowance generated through project activity to 
national registry. As an example, after certification of the project activities which are 
undertaken in a developed country that has an emission reduction commitment under the 
Kyoto Protocol, the developed country must issue in its national registry a quantity of 
Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) equivalent to credits generated from project activities. This 
type of “backing” should work to guarantee the compatibility of project based credits (JI or 
domestic PBM) with the issuing country’s emissions commitment under the Kyoto Protocol 
(Bosi and Bygrave, 2004). In the absence of such a “backing” there appears more credits, 
which could compromise the economic efficiency of the system through reducing the credit 
prices. 
III. DATA, MEASUREMENT, AND ADDITIONALITY 
 The most significant critiques on project based mechanism contain the issues; data, 
measurement and especially additionality. Many scientists have argued that project 
activities could generate tradable credits, although they have no additional contribution in 
terms of environment. To verify a project activity, first the baseline, what would have 
happened in the absence of the project activity, should be estimated. Later, the GHG 
emissions from the project activity site should be monitored. If the project activity is 
assessed to be additional relative to the baseline, the project activity can be rewarded with 
tradable emission credits. The number of the credits depends on the difference between the 
hypothetical case and actual case. These procedures expose that the wrong calculation of 
baseline, not having accurate data, or having wrong/biased assessment in verification 
procedure compromise the success of the project based mechanism.  
 The greatest challenge while determining the baseline and calculating project 
emission is uncertainty. Begg et al. (1999) state that the largest source of uncertainty in 
accounting for emissions reductions is the counter factuality of the baseline and within the 
baseline, the main sources of uncertainty tend to be the choice of technology and timing of 
its introduction. They further state that to a large extent such uncertainty cannot be reduced 
even with a detailed case by case assessment. Hence, the result of emission reduction 
project cannot be measured 100% accurately. Nevertheless, good data and confidence in the 
validity of the baseline and project emissions measurements or estimates can minimize the 
uncertainty of project's emission reductions result.  
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 The accurate assessment requires good data and measurement. However, some 
developing countries cannot afford the necessary economic and technologic conditions for 
acquiring good data and measurement. The projects undertaken in such developing 
countries may compromise, therefore, the success of the mechanism.     
 Number of the credits generated through a project activity depends on how the 
baseline is defined. While the best possible result can be obtained if the baselines are 
calculated on a case-by-case basis. This can be very costly and it can reduce the cost 
effective benefit of the mechanism. On the other hand, general baseline methods can also 
not satisfy the accurate baselines, because the average factors affecting emissions could 
vary country to country or even region to region. The GHG Protocol for Project Accounting 
(by WBCSD/WRI) was developed to assist countries in estimation of baseline and accounting 
GHG emissions in most possible accurate, rigorous, transparent and comparable manner. To 
assist countries in reaching the best possible estimate of historical annual, national 
emissions in a consistent, transparent and comparable manner, Guidelines on National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories was developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC). These guidelines provide reliable methods for the regions where site specific 
data are not available.  These methods are also used for calculation of fuels used in national 
emission inventory and translate this into GHG emissions by using appropriate emissions 
factors. With help of these common guidance, the inconsistency between data sets caused 
by different data providers and baseline estimations can be minimized. While determining 
baseline and collecting data at these early years of project activities are not easy, they will 
become easier over time with the collected data and gained experiences. 
 In the report prepared for WWF (2007) the additionality of CDM projects are 
assessed and they conclude that a significant amount of registered projects are not 
additional. The main reasons of projects being not additional are as follows; lack of objective 
and transparent criteria for assessing additionality, guidance in the tools to demonstrate 
additionality mostly has not been applied correctly, most projects would be implemented 
without the CDM, and some projects have small economic attractiveness and barriers 
prevent the investment decisions. Further they assess, "Any approach to assess additionality 
will not be perfect. It will need to be accepted that there are some free-riding projects taking 
part in the CDM... In defining the requirements on additionality, a balance between the 
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number of acceptable free-riders and the lost opportunities of CDM projects needs to be 
found. Free-riders result in increased global GHG emissions because the CDM is an offset 
mechanism..., lost opportunities for CDM projects result in higher global GHG mitigation 
costs and ... to less benefits for sustainable development in the host countries. In this regard, 
the acceptable level of free-riding in the CDM is a policy decision which needs to balance the 
amount of “hot air” in the CDM against lost opportunities for CDM projects." 
 The main reason of linkage between project based mechanism and cap and trade 
scheme is providing cost effective abatement options for participants. If the projects do not 
realize their environmental objectives, the linkage may compromise the environmental and 
economic objectives. The more rigorous regulations (having sufficient confidence in 
monitoring, verification, and reporting) and experiences to be gained would reduce concerns 
in this regard. 
IV. SHOULD THE PROJECT BASED CREDITS BE RESTRICTED? 
  Level of the complementarily use of credits generated through project based 
mechanisms to meet GHG reduction targets and restrictions on usable project based credits 
are important issues associated with linkage between cap and trade scheme and project 
based mechanism. Because project based mechanism could only generate supply of tradable 
emission credits, it should be linked to another emissions trading system. Regulatory 
authority could restrict the total usable project based credits in order to comply with GHG 
reduction target or it could even allow participants to achieve all targeted GHG reductions 
through project based mechanism. Policymakers have to take account the issues related 
with project based mechanism, and also should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of 
restricting before implementing any restriction. The question, whether it should be 
supplemental to domestic reduction targets or may it be used without any restriction, 
should be elaborated by policy designers very carefully. 
 One reason of limiting project based credits is based on the environmental integrity 
concerns of project based mechanism. While cap and trade schemes realize additional and 
real reductions, the reductions implemented through project based mechanisms are in most 
cases contentious. Another reason is that if the use of offset credits are not limited, while in 
a cap and trade scheme the reductions are undertaken in installations under the scheme, 
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the linkage with a project based mechanism, which may allow participants to implement 
projects outside of the scheme (e.g. CDM), may allow participants to implement all required 
emissions reduction outside of their installations. For the purpose of long term emission 
reduction achievement, the emission reductions in installations under the cap and trade 
scheme should be primary targets. Also, allowing to use large amounts of offset credits may 
cause to lose incentives to develop abatement technologies in capped sectors. One last 
reason is that limiting use of offset credits may result in ensuring that only credits with a 
certain quality enter the system. 
 There are different types of restrictions to limit usage of offset credits. Authorities 
could limit the type of projects or amount of credits or they may also limit the geographies in 
which the projects are allowed to be undertaken. Authorities may prevent use of offset 
credits to meet GHG reduction targets from some certain type of projects. In doing so, 
authorities could promote the projects that have more benefits for sustainable development 
and are additional. However, the question of which project types should be excluded or 
included is difficult to answer. In the report prepared for WWF (2007), author states that the 
basic problems in the CDM has to do with the way in which DOEs (Designated Operational 
Entities) are  working and the way additionality is assessed. Another restriction could be on  
the quantity of offset credits (WWF 2007). Policymakers could limit the quantity of offset 
credits that are eligible for use in meeting emission-reduction targets. This limit is most 
commonly declared as a percentage of the total emission reduction or entity-level emission 
reduction requirements that can be met through offsets. There could be also supply limits, 
which establish a predetermined amount of offset credits that are issued in a given 
compliance period. Regardless of the number and type of offset projects available in the 
larger market, only those that were able to obtain credit through the regulatory supply 
program would be eligible for compliance use (Ensuring Offset Quality, 2008). One other 
restriction option under discussion is discounting the credits earned from project based 
mechanism against cap and trade allowances. By discounting offset projects against cap and 
trade allowances, the environmental concerns related with project based mechanisms can 
be reduced. For example, two offset credits may be exchanged for one cap and trade 
allowance or countries may retire a certain percentage of their earned offset credits. The 
retired amount may represent an atmospheric benefit, as proposed by Environmental 
Defense (2007).  
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 There are also economic and environmental arguments against limiting usage of 
offset credits to meet GHG emission reduction commitments. The most significant argument 
is that climate change is not an issue related with a specific location, but rather any emission 
reduction actualized in World contributes in achievement of long term targets. Offset 
Quality Initiative (OQI) proposes not restricting the usage of offset credits. Further the OQI 
state that by lowering the cost of the total system, the use of offsets could allow for the 
implementation of a more stringent cap, which would result in even greater emission 
reductions in both near- and long-term (Ensuring Offset Quality, 2008). 
V. RAISING CONCERNS RELATED WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 To achieve a long term emission reduction target, not only developed countries 
should take action, but also developing countries. Some project based mechanisms, such as 
CDM, include the projects taken place in developing countries, which may also be seen as a 
pilot period for developing countries to get used to reduction activities. Considering climate 
change as a long term issue, the project activities undertaken in developing countries will 
assist these countries to meet with their emission reduction targets to be taken in near 
future. Beside this objective, another objective of the project based mechanism undertaken 
in developing countries is to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable 
development. Linking such a project based mechanism with a cap and trade scheme may 
increase the number of the projects undertaken in developing countries. 
 To generate CERs from a CDM project, project has to meet with sustainable 
development goal, which should be assessed by host country. To date, many papers state 
that the contribution of the CDM to sustainable development is very low34
                                                            
34  Sutter and Parreño (2007) state that only 1-2% of the CERs come from projects contribute to 
sustainable development, see also Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007. 
. Although the 
project's contribution to sustainable development is very hard to determine, most countries 
define their criteria, which consist of many different aspects, including environmental, social, 
economic and technological criteria. Generally, countries accept the projects complied with 
at least one of the criteria. Therefore, most of the countries are not too ambitious about 
searching for a high contribution to sustainable development. This case suggests that 
expecting high sustainable development contributions from projects is not possible, if there 
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is not any consensus among developing countries to resist against the projects with low (or 
no) contribution to sustainable development. Any country’s resistance may cause the 
possible projects to move another country, which is willing to host projects. If all host 
countries would reject projects with few benefits for sustainable development, the global 
CDM portfolio would be impacted, as investors and project developers would have to focus 
on projects with high benefits for sustainable development (WWF, 2007).   
 Linking project based mechanism to cap and trade scheme, basically, provide 
opportunities to implement cost effective projects in different countries for participants. 
Countries or firms benefits from the differences in MACs. Although competitively 
determined price is a key feature of market, it is not valid for CDM. Thus, unlike a tradable 
permit market where infra-marginal units of abatement are also sold at the prevailing 
market price, this may not always be the case under CDM and division of gains (the 
difference between MACs) could be an important issue for CDM projects (Gupta, 2004)35
 
. 
Chander (2003) suggests that rather than receiving a competitive market price for emission 
reductions, developing countries may simply be paid the actual cost of abatement, perhaps 
with some markup. 
 Another issue associated with developing countries is related with near future. While 
developed countries has been implementing the low cost abatement projects in developing 
countries, in case the developing countries commit to emission reduction in emissions, the 
projects undertaken till that date will only leave them with higher cost options. However, 
Karp and Liu (2000) point out that the main problem with CDM is not that the most 
profitable projects would be taken up first, which is a normal consequence, but the 
possibility that the host country receives inadequate compensation. Gupta (2004) suggests 
that this can be solved if host countries could create and bank their own CERs. If the 
developing countries assess the price of offset credits very low, they can hold the credits till 
they can take the price they desired. 
 
                                                            
35  Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and Project-based Mechanisms, 2004, OECD 
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5. CASE STUDY: EU ETS 
 This section studies the EU ETS case, as an example for the technical issues addressed 
by the previous sections. As the current biggest cap and trade scheme, EU ETS is linked to 
project based mechanisms defined by Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism 
(Article 12) and Joint Implementation (Article 6). Linkage between these three mechanisms 
was established with the so called "Linking Directive"36
 
. Linking Directive allows EU ETS' 
participants to use certified emission reductions (CERs) and emission reduction units (ERUs) 
generated through CDM/JI to meet EU ETS obligations. The goals of the Linkage and the 
benefits of JI and CDM are defined by the Directive’s 3. article; 
 “Linking the Kyoto project-based mechanisms to the Community scheme (EU’s ETS), while safeguarding the latter’s environmental integrity, gives the opportunity to use emission credits generated through project activities eligible pursuant to Articles 6 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol in order to fulfil Member States’ obligations in accordance with Article 12(3) of Directive 2003/87/EC. As a result, this will increase the diversity of low-cost compliance options within the Community scheme leading to a reduction of the overall costs of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol while improving the liquidity of the Community market in greenhouse gas emission allowances. By stimulating demand for JI credits, Community companies will invest in the development and transfer of advanced environmentally sound technologies and know-how. The demand for CDM credits will also be stimulated and thus developing countries hosting CDM projects will be assisted in achieving their sustainable development goals.” 
 The European Commission established a Working Group under the European Climate 
Change Programme to examine the possible flexible mechanisms in meeting GHG targets. A 
Sub-Group on JI and CDM was further established in 2001 to study the linkage between the 
EU ETS and project based mechanisms (Bosi and Bygrave, 2004). From various authors, a 
number of reasons have been identified to justify pursuing the linkage of JI and CDM to the 
EU ETS (ECCP 2002, Wemaere 2003, EC 2003a, Runge-Metzger 2003). Mainly, the reasons 
can be ordered as follows; 
                                                            
36  The European Parliament and Council issued Directive 2004/101/EC on 27 October 2004 to cover the 
text of the Kyoto Protocol with relevance to the EEA. This Directive effectively amended the original Directive 
2003/87/EC which set up the EU ETS. 
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Linking of the EU ETS to CDM/JI 
• increases compliance options for entities, reduces overall compliance costs, and improves 
liquidity of the emissions trading market within the EU, 
• contributes to the sustainable development objectives of host countries, and promotes the 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies to third countries, 
• drives environmental policy integration in EU external policies and contributes to the EU 
Strategy on Sustainable Development, 
• fosters international cooperation on common policies and a multilateral approach to 
climate change. 
 Before going any further, there should be four answers, which are given to the 
following questions by the Linking Directive, to better understand the Directive. 
 When should a link be established? 
 What projects should be linked? 
 How should the regimes be linked? 
 How much should the regimes be linked? 
The concerns, associated with project based mechanisms’ environmental integrity or the 
fear that a massive import of JI and CDM credits into the EU ETS would significantly lower 
the market price of the CO2 allowances and lead to little or no domestic abatement, arose 
the objections of many environmental non-governmental organizations (NGO) to the linkage 
(Lefevere, 2005).  Considering these concerns, Linking Directive introduced some restrictions 
on projects and quantities.   
 Member States are allowed to use the credits generated through CDM projects as of 
2005, and to use the credits generated through JI projects as of 2008. As a consequence of 
the significant concerns about the environmental effects of projects, some project types are 
excluded from recognition. Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities are 
excluded from the EU ETS, because the Commission concluded that including LULUCF 
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activities could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, for the following 
reasons; 
• LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. 
Insufficient solutions have been developed to deal with the uncertainties, non-
permanence of carbon storage and potential emissions 'leakage' problems arising 
from such projects. The temporary and reversible nature of such activities would 
pose considerable risks in a company-based trading system and impose great liability 
risks on Member States. 
• The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and 
reporting comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from installations 
currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely to incur 
costs which would substantially reduce the attractiveness of including such projects. 
• The simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be considerably 
reduced. Moreover, the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the system could 
undermine the functioning of the carbon market unless their role were limited, in 
which case their potential benefits would become marginal.37
Another project type excluded from EU ETS is projects in nuclear facilities. This type of 
projects are excluded directly by the Marrakesh Accords, which refer to the a set of 
agreements reached at the Conference of the Parties 7 (COP7)
 
38
                                                            
37  
 meeting in 2001 on the 
rules of meeting the targets set out in the Kyoto Protocol. Except these types of projects, 
Linking Directive stipulates Member States to decide which CERs and ERUs can be used. In 
addition, another project type addressed by Linking Directive is Hydroelectric power project 
activities. World Commission on Dams (WCD) identified the Criteria and guidelines that are 
relevant to considering whether hydroelectric power production projects have negative 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/35, page was seen on 
23.02.2010. 
38 Since 1995, the parties to the convention have met annually in Conferences of the Parties (COP) to 
progress in combating climate change. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted and the detailed rules for the 
implementation of the Protocol were adopted at COP7, in 2001.   
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environmental or social impact in its report39
                                                            
39  World Commission on Dams November 2000 Report “Dams and Development — A New Framework 
for Decision-Making” 
, 2000. Article 11b (6) of the Directive defines 
the requirements for the hydro electric power project activities that when Member States 
approve such project activities, they shall ensure that relevant international criteria and 
guidelines will be respected during the development of such project activities. 
 To answer the question “how should the regimes be linked?”, the values of the Kyoto 
units should be addressed. Units traded under the EU ETS are fully “fungible” (all units are 
fully interchangeable and thus one CER or ERU corresponds to one EUA) and that Member 
States are required to accept all EU allowances for compliance, irrespective of the company 
that the allowance was originally allocated to and the country it was originally allocated by 
(Emissions Trading Policy Brief, Vol.5, 2003). 
  Taking into consideration the primary targets of the scheme, the environmental 
impact and economic effectiveness, the Commission has tried to prevent the possible issues 
arising from linkage by applying the principal “supplementarity”. The Marrakesh Accords 
state that “the use of the mechanisms (i.e. International emissions trading, JI and CDM) shall 
be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic action shall thus constitute a 
significant element of the effort made by each Party included in Annex I to meet its 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments”. However, the Marrakesh 
Accords do not define exactly how this “supplementarity” should be, and the Accords leave 
the decisions on this issue to Parties. In the first period (2005-2007), EU ETS Directive 
(Criterion 12 of Annex III) states that “Member States shall specify the maximum amount of 
CERs and ERUs which may be used by operators in the Community scheme as a percentage 
of the allocation of the allowances to each installation. The percentage shall be consistent 
with the Member State’s supplementarity obligations under the Kyoto Protocol and 
decisions adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol”. Although these 
definitions were made by Marrakesh Accords and EU ETS Directive, no precise information 
was provided with respect to the “supplemental” character of the flexible mechanisms.  
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 European Commission became more assertive with the guidance40, the third 
guidance on the criteria of Annex III published in November 2006, on the principle 
“supplementarity” with respect to the second phase, which represents Kyoto commitment 
period, 2008-2012. This report announced that the Commission would assess the National 
Allocation Plans41
 The Commission stated that the “reduction effort”, that Member States had to make 
to meet their Kyoto targets, will be taken as the basis for the maximum overall amount of 
JI/CDM credits that Member States are allowed to demand. The calculation of “reduction 
effort” requires three different years’ emissions results, the base year of the Kyoto 
Protocol
 in a manner which would allow the EU ETS “ to unfold its full 
environmental and economic potential in terms of environmental and economic benefits”. In 
addition, the Commission introduced a three-step process to calculate the percentage of 
usable Kyoto units consistent with the supplementary principle. In first step, Commission 
introduced a formula allowing the calculation of the overall amount of JI and CDM credits to 
which a Member State can have recourse in second phase. Second step indicated which 
rules Member States have to observe when fixing the limit for the use of Kyoto units for the 
covered sectors. Moreover, the Commission defined a minimum threshold for the use of 
Kyoto units. 
42
                                                            
40  European Communication (2006). Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the 
European Parliament on the assessment of national allocation plans for the allocation of greenhouse gas 
emission allowances in the second period of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme accompanying Commission 
Decisions of 29 November 2006 on the national allocation plans of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom in accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC 
41  The National Allocation Plan defines the basis on which allocations of free greenhouse gas emission 
allowances to individual installations covered by the Emissions Trading Scheme will be made. 
 (in general 1990), greenhouse gas emissions in 2010, and projected emissions in 
2010. Among these “reduction effort”, half of the figure representing the highest effort is 
calculated and it is considered to be the maximum overall amount of JI/CDM credits that a 
Member State can make use of in addition to domestic action. Sépibus (2008) state that the 
Commission was able to take into account the large diversity of Member States’ emission 
paths since 1990 without penalizing one over the other, by allowing Member States to rely 
42  Although in general “1990” is the base year for the desired emissions reduction in Kyoto Protocol, the 
base years vary from 1985 to 1995 according to the Parties. Kyoto Protocol base year data; 
http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/kp_data_unfccc/base_year_data/items/4354.php 
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on the highest figure resulting from these calculations. And this calculation method reduced 
significantly the conflicts arising from its different interpretations by Member States of the 
“supplementarity” principle.  
 The EU ETS Directive declared the specific sectors covered and non-covered by the 
scheme. The Commission declared that there is no restriction on which sectors should 
undertake the burden of the domestic “reduction effort” in Member States. They are, 
therefore, free to choose the sectors. A Member State may allow its operators covered by 
the EU ETS to make use Kyoto units to the full amount of the limit, in case this Member State 
did not intend to purchase any CDM/JI units with government funds43. On the contrary, if 
the Member States had purchased Kyoto units, or intended to do so, they have to reduce 
the amount of JI/CDM credits, which can be used by installations in the Community scheme, 
by the annual average amount of intended or substantiated government purchases44
  Table 8:Calculation of Maximum amount of JI/CDM credits Member States were allowed to 
have recourse between 2008-2012%
.                                                    
45
                                                            
43  Point 2.3 reads: “In respect of Member States which do not intend to purchase any Kyoto units with 
government funds, a Member State may allow its operators covered by the Community scheme to make use of 
CDM/JI credits to the full amount of this limit. This limit is to be understood as a percentage figure specified as 
a share of the approved cap for the trading sector. If Member States allowed a higher level of usage, criterion 
(12) is considered to be violated." See European Commission, COM (2006) 725.   
44  “In respect of Member States which intend to purchase Kyoto units with government funds, these 
purchases are taken into account. The amount of JI/CDM credits that can be used by installations in the 
Community scheme in that Member State is reduced by the annual average amount of intended or 
substantiated government purchases.” See European Commission, COM (2006) 725 
 
45  European Communication (2006). Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the 
European Parliament on the assessment of national allocation plans for the allocation of greenhouse gas 
emission allowances in the second period of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme accompanying Commission 
Decisions of 29 November 2006 on the national allocation plans of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom in accordance with Directive 2003/87/EC 
In practical terms the Commission assesses consistency with supplementary obligations 
based 
on the following formulae: 
 
    A = base year emissions – emissions allowed under Kyoto target 
    B = greenhouse gas emissions in 2004 – emissions allowed under Kyoto target 
    C = projected emissions in 2010 – emissions allowed under Kyoto target 
    D = 50 % of Max (A, B, C) – annual average government purchase of Kyoto units 
            Maximum allowed limit (in %) = (D / annual average cap) or 10 % 
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While the European Commission set the overall maximum allowed limit to use 
CDM/JI credits to meet Kyoto GHG reduction obligations with a formula based on each 
Parties’ self reduction effort, the Commission defined the minimum threshold to use credits 
generated through Kyoto flexibility mechanisms as 10%46
a.  LINKING DIRECTIVE WITH RESPECT TO DOUBLE COUNTING 
. According to the Commission’s 
statement to endorse this decision “This reflects a reasonable balance between domestic 
reductions and giving operators of installations an incentive to invest in projects in 
developing countries”.   
 As mentioned before, the double counting affects the success of the emissions 
trading systems both in economic and environmental terms. From the economic point of 
view, the double counting is not desirable, because the more allowances in market results in 
lower allowance prices and from the environmental point of view, double counting results in 
more allowances in market than there should be otherwise, due to the verification of 
reductions, which are not genuine.   
 Double Counting may occur, if the emission reductions are undertaken in the 
installations covered by the cap and trade scheme. As stated in Section 4, the best option to 
avoid such a double counting is separating the sectors, in which the projects can take place 
and the sectors covered by the scheme. As the CER credits are generated through CDM 
projects, which are undertaken in developing countries, this credits does not imply a risk in 
this context. Therefore, this option should be considered in the EU ETS in terms of JI 
projects. The Directive states that “no ERUs are allowed to be issued for reductions or 
limitations of GHG that take place in installations under the EU ETS”. The Commission also 
considered the possibility that Member States might have allowed such projects before the 
decision. The Commission, therefore, further states that if the Member States have 
committed themselves before the declaration of the decision to issuing such credits from 
                                                            
46  “Where assessment in accordance with these approaches would result in a situation that EU ETS 
installations in that Member State would only be able to use JI/CDM credits up to a level of less than 10%, the 
Commission considers that as a minimum threshold installations should be allowed to use JI/CDM credits up to 
a level of 10%.” See European Commission, COM (2006) 725 
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direct reductions47 or limitations that result in double counting, it allows ERUs to be issued 
until 31 December 2012 provided that the Member States cancel an equal number of 
allowances. And the national authorities are responsible for cancelling these allowances in 
the national registry of the Member State that issues the ERUs from indirect reductions or 
limitations48
b.  ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE AND BASELINE 
. In addition, the EU ETS requires establishment of two different set-asides in 
the national allocation plan (NAP) of Member States for the period 2008-2012, one for 
approved projects and another for planned projects. If a Member State will host approved 
projects, which will take place in its installations covered by the emissions trading scheme 
and may cause double counting, that Member State has to list such approved project 
activities and their anticipated reductions or limitations. In the same way, if a Member State 
intend to host project activities, which may take place in its installations covered by the 
emissions trading scheme and may cause double counting, that Member State has to list 
planned project activities and its anticipated reductions or limitations. In the event of the 
quantity of allowances in the set-aside for approved projects not converted to ERUs they 
may be sold, whereas allowances in the set-aside for planned projects not issued as ERUs are 
cancelled.    
 With regard to baseline establishment, Linking Directive states that (Article 11b) 
Member States has to take into account the Acquis Communautaire (EU legislation) in the 
establishment of baselines for project activities undertaken in member and candidate 
countries. The Acquis Communautaire relevant to climate change, under the environment49
                                                            
47  Definition of “Direct Reduction”; “ ‘direct emission reduction or limitation’ means a reduction or 
limitation of emissions occurring due to a project activity which causes reductions or limitations of emissions in 
installations that are individually identified in the project activity’s baseline established pursuant to decisions of 
the United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC)” ., European Commission, 
2006/780/EC 
48 Definition of Indirect Reduction: ‘indirect emission reduction or limitation’ means any reductions or 
limitations of emissions in  installations falling under the scope of Directive 2003/87/EC that is not a direct 
emission reduction or limitation”, European Commission, 2006/780/EC  
 
49  Chapter 27: Environment: EU environment policy aims to promote sustainable development and 
protect the environment for present and future generations. It is based on preventive action, the polluter pays 
principle, fighting environmental damage at source, shared responsibility and the integration of environmental 
protection into other EU policies. The acquis comprises over 200 major legal acts covering horizontal 
legislation, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution control and risk 
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chapter, includes minimum environmental standards (such as emission limit values for large 
combustion plants), and market based instruments (i.e. the EU ETS). There are directives 
under the Acquis Communautaire which affect the baselines directly and indirectly. 
Integrated Pollution Prevention Control (IPPC) Directive50 and Landfill Directive51
                                                                                                                                                                                          
management, chemicals and genetically modified organisms (GMOs), noise and forestry. Compliance with the 
acquis requires significant investment. A strong and well-equipped administration at national and local level is 
imperative for the application and enforcement of the environment acquis. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_e
u/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm 
 have direct 
effect on the baseline establishment of the projects undertaken in Member States (Joint 
Implementation Projects). Directives on fuel quality and vehicle emissions, and the Large 
Combustion Plant Directive have indirect effects on the baseline establishment of the JI 
projects. There may be different implementations of Acquis Communautaire among 
Member States owing to two main reasons. First reason is that transition measures can be 
negotiated with the Commission for some reasons, e.g. when a substantial adaptation of 
infrastructure is needed and secondly, EU environmental legislation is often defined in terms 
of Best Available Technologies (BAT). Development level of each country varies and 
therefore BAT may vary among countries, or even within a country and it can be subject to 
negotiations. Through the constant update of Best Available Technique Reference 
Documents (BREF), IPPC does not leave a wide room for negotiations, and it narrows 
considerable room for movement in respect of setting the baseline (Javier de Cendra de 
Larragan, 2006).  
 
 
50  The objectives and principles of the Community’s environment policy, as set out in Article 174 of the 
Treaty, consist in particular of preventing, reducing and as far as possible eliminating pollution by giving priority 
to intervention at source and ensuring prudent management of natural resources, in compliance with the 
‘polluter pays’ principle and the principle of pollution prevention., European Commission Directive 2008/1/EC 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:024:0008:0029:EN:PDF 
51  The Directive's overall aim is "to prevent or reduce as far as possible negative effects on the 
environment, in particular the pollution of surface water, groundwater, soil and air, and on the global 
environment, including the greenhouse effect, as well as any resulting risk to human health, from the landfilling 
of waste, during the whole life-cycle of the landfill", European Commission Directive 1999/31/EC   http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:182:0001:0019:EN:PDF 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 The two of the most important policy instruments to reduce GHG emissions and so its 
impacts in climate change are cap and trade scheme and project based mechanism. Cap and 
trade scheme covers the biggest emitters in a region and determines a total emission for the 
scheme. Participants may sell or buy emission allowances in order to comply with their own 
emission limits. Because of the reasons, such as administration and ease of measurement, 
the scheme could not cover all installations in a region. On the other hand, project based 
mechanisms provide participants to undertake emission reduction activities out of their 
sources, which may be more cost effective. Because the project based mechanisms include 
voluntary activities, these mechanisms should be linked to another emissions trading 
system. The costly structure of the emission reduction activities discourages a substantial 
part of the businesses to take action against climate change. Therefore, the idea, the 
discouraged firms may be persuaded to commit emission reductions with the help of the 
cost effective methods like project based mechanisms, has an important role to build an 
action with a great support from all possible sources.   
 To establish a linkage between these two different mechanisms, first of all, these 
mechanisms should have same unit of emission or emission reductions, namely one 
emission allowance from cap and trade scheme and emission credit from project based 
mechanism should correspond to one specific unit (e.g. a tonne of CO2 equivalent). Linkage 
between these mechanisms is a desired situation considering its emergent advantages. The 
most prominent advantage of linkage is that it may provide more cost effective greenhouse 
gas mitigation possibilities for participants. While providing such a big economical advantage 
for participants, it may increase the market liquidity which also may reduce the allowance 
price in the market and consequently linkage may lower compliance costs of meeting 
environmental targets. Because of some administrative and measurement issues, cap and 
trade scheme could not cover all sources, hence, the desired scope expansion of the sources 
may be achieved through linkage between cap and trade scheme and project based 
mechanism. Beside these advantages, linkage may provide experiences for new mitigation 
methods and new sectors. This is also very important considering that in future the scope of 
the cap and trade scheme should be expanded in order to ensure a greater emission 
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reduction and the appropriate sectors could be discovered through project based 
mechanisms activities. Projects like CDM, which are implemented in developing countries, 
contribute the countries’ sustainable development, so that these countries meet with new 
technologies via these activities and also they find the possibility to attract foreign 
investment.      
 Beside these economic advantages, there are some issues which should be 
elaborated carefully in order to not compromise the advantages of the linkage. While 
designing a linkage between these two schemes, the rules should be defined in accordance 
with avoiding double counting. Double counting issue occurs when an emission reduction is 
assessed and credited twice. It leads to an increase in allowances in market and collapses the 
prices. Separating the scopes of two mechanisms is the most effective method to avoid 
double counting. While it is the most straightforward method, it is also possible allowing 
participants to undertake emission reduction activities in installations covered by the cap 
and trade scheme, but this requires careful ex-ante monitoring and planning and also it 
could increase administration costs. If the authority allows participants to implement project 
activities in sources covered by the cap and trade scheme, this may require a set-aside of 
allowances equal to the credits which will be generated through the approved or planned 
activities. Defining project boundaries clearly is also very crucial point. Another option is 
global registry system. Giving to each emission reduction a serial number and retiring the 
serial number once it is traded may help avoiding double counting.  
 Another design issue is supplementarity. The rising environmental concerns with 
regard to project based mechanisms affect this issue. Generally the schemes restricts the 
use of the credits generated through project based mechanisms. The Kyoto Protocol states 
that these credits should be supplemental to domestic reductions. The participants should 
reduce their own emissions in the first place to achieve a long term emission reduction 
target. Also there are concerns which push policy makers to restrict credits from project 
based mechanisms whether or not the projects materialize into real and additional emission 
reductions. The counter assertion is that the use of credits should not be restricted because 
the impact of reduction in the air is independent of its location.  
 A project activity should be certified in order to generate tradable credit. The volume 
of credits as a consequence of a project activity relies especially on determination of the 
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terms; baseline, leakage, permanence, project boundary. How these terms are defined, 
calculated or estimated affect the environmental and economic impacts of the activity. An 
accurate assessment of the project requires good data and measurement. The result of 
emission reduction project cannot be measured 100% accurately. Nevertheless, good data 
and confidence in the validity of the baseline and project emissions measurements or 
estimates can minimize the uncertainty of project's emission reductions result. Satisfying 
good data and measurement is very important to gain confidence with regard to 
additionality of project based activities. To build a more reliable mechanism the projects 
should measure and calculate their results according to widely accepted guidance. 
 Clean Development Mechanism is defined by the Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which allows countries to implement emission reduction projects in developing countries. 
While developed countries are benefiting from the cost effective projects in developing 
countries, these projects also contribute to developing countries’ sustainable development. 
But also there are rising concerns with regard to these projects. First concern is that most of 
the projects are awarded although they do not contribute their sustainable development. 
This is a very big challenge to solve if there is no consensus among developing countries to 
resist against the projects with low (or no) contribution to sustainable development. Second 
concern is that in case the developing countries commit to emission reduction in emissions 
in future, the projects undertaken till that date will only leave them with higher cost options. 
This can be solved if host countries could create and bank their own CERs.  
 European Union Emission Trading Scheme is the biggest cap and trade scheme. It 
covers 27 countries and almost 11,500 installations. The EU ETS allows participants to use 
credits generated through Joint Implementation or Clean Development Mechanism to 
comply with their emission reduction goals. The Linking Directive allows to use credits from 
CDM as of 2005 and from JI as of 2008. Credits generated via LULUCF projects and nuclear 
facilities are not allowed to use. In the first phase the EU ETS allowed each Party to decide its 
maximum usable credits, in the second period the European Union determined a formula to 
calculate the country’s maximum usable credits earned from project based mechanisms. 
While this formula defines the minimum threshold as 10% of total allowances, the maximum 
threshold is calculated according to each country’s “reduction effort”.  
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 Linking Directive was established in 2003. In an amendment the EU ETS decided to 
separate the scopes of the cap and trade scheme and project based mechanisms to avoid 
double counting. However, there are some projects which are approved, planned or 
undertaken before this decision. Therefore, the EU Commission decided considering this 
situation that; 
• EU ETS allows ERUs and CERs to be issued until 31 December 2012, even if the 
reductions or limitations of the project activities indirectly or directly reduce or limit 
the emissions of installations that fall under the Community emissions trading 
scheme, provided that an equal number of allowances is cancelled. 
In addition, the EU ETS requires establishment of two different set-asides in the national 
allocation plan (NAP) of Member States for the period 2008-2012, one for approved projects 
and another for planned projects. With regard to baseline establishment, Linking Directive 
states that Member States has to take into account the Acquis Communautaire in the 
establishment of baselines for project activities undertaken in member and candidate 
countries. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Additionality: Emissions reductions 
achieved through a given project (or class 
of projects) over and above those that 
would otherwise have occurred in the 
absence of the project(s) under a 
business-as-usual scenario. Additionality is 
a criterion for approval of project-based 
activities (offsets) under the Clean 
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto 
Protocol as well as offset projects allowed 
for credit under other emissions trading 
programs.  
Allowance: A government-issued 
authorization to emit a certain amount. In 
greenhouse gas markets, an allowance is 
commonly denominated as one ton of 
CO2
Auctioning: A method for distributing 
emission allowances in a cap and trade 
system whereby allowances are sold to 
the highest bidder. This method of 
distribution may be combined with other 
forms of allowance distribution.  
Banking: The carry-over of unused 
allowances or offset credits from one 
compliance period to the next.  
Baseline: The target, often the historical 
emissions from a designated past year, 
against which emission reduction goals are 
measured.  
Benchmarking: An allowance allocation 
method in which allowances are 
distributed by setting a level of permitted 
emissions per unit of input or output. 
Borrowing: A mechanism under a cap-
and-trade program that allows covered 
entities to use allowances designated for a 
future compliance period to meet the 
requirements of the current compliance 
period. Borrowing may entail penalties to 
reflect a programmatic preference for 
near-term emissions reductions. 
Cap and Trade: A cap-and-trade system 
sets an overall limit on emissions, requires 
entities subject to the system to hold 
sufficient allowances to cover their 
emissions, and provides broad flexibility in 
the means of compliance. Entities can 
comply by undertaking emission reduction 
projects at their covered facilities and/or 
by purchasing emission allowances (or 
credits) from the government or from 
other entities that have generated 
emission reductions in excess of their 
compliance obligations. 
Carbon Tax: A surcharge on the carbon 
content of fossil fuels that aims to 
discourage their use and thereby reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions. 
e per year. See also “permit” and 
“credits (a.k.a. carbon credits).” The total 
number of allowances distributed to all 
entities in a cap and trade system is 
determined by the size of the overall cap 
on emissions. 
Allowance distribution: The process by 
which emissions allowances are initially 
distributed under an emissions cap and 
trade system. Authorizations to emit can 
initially be distributed in a number of 
ways, either through some form of 
auction, free allocation, or some of both.  
Afforestation: The process of establishing 
and growing forests on bare or cultivated 
land, which has not been forested in 
recent history. 
Assigned Amount Unit (AAU): Annex I 
Parties are issued AAUs up to the level of 
their assigned amount, corresponding to 
the quantity of greenhouse gases they can 
release in accordance with the Kyoto 
Protocol (Art. 3), during the first 
commitment period of that protocol 
(2008-12). AAUs equal one tCO2e. 
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Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CO2e): The 
universal unit of measurement used to 
indicate the global warming potential of 
each of the six greenhouse gases. Carbon 
dioxide — a naturally occurring gas that is 
a byproduct of burning fossil fuels and 
biomass, land-use changes, and other 
industrial processes — is the reference gas 
against which the other greenhouse gases 
are measured. 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs): A 
unit of greenhouse gas emission 
reductions issued pursuant to the Clean 
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto 
Protocol, and measured in metric tonnes 
of carbon dioxide equivalent. One CER 
represents a reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions of one tCO2e. 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): 
The mechanism provided by Article 12 of 
the Kyoto Protocol, designed to assist 
developing countries in achieving 
sustainable development by permitting 
industrialized countries to finance projects 
for reducing greenhouse gas emission in 
developing countries and receive credit 
for doing so.  
Command and Control: A system of 
regulation that prescribes emission limits 
and compliance methods on a facility-by-
facility or source-by-source basis and that 
has been the traditional approach to 
reducing air pollution. 
Credits: Credits can be distributed by the 
government for emission reductions 
achieved by offset projects or by achieving 
environmental performance beyond a 
regulatory standard. 
Conference of Parties (COP): The Meeting 
of Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Eligibility Requirements: There 
are six Eligibility Requirements for 
Participating in Emissions Trading (Art. 17) 
for Annex I Parties. Those are: (i) being a 
Party to the Kyoto Protocol, (ii) having 
calculated and recorded one’s Assigned 
Amount, (iii) having in place a national 
system for inventory, (iv) having in place a 
national registry, (v) having submitted an 
annual inventory and (vi) submit 
supplementary information on assigned 
amount. An Annex I party will 
automatically become eligible after 16 
months have elapsed since the submission 
of its report on calculation of its assigned 
amount. Then, this Party and any entity 
having opened an account in the registry 
can participate in Emissions Trading. 
However, a Party could lose its eligibility if 
the Enforcement Branch of the 
Compliance Committee has determined 
the Party is non-compliant with the 
eligibility requirements. 
Downstream (source-based) System: Also 
known as a source-based system, a 
downstream cap-and-trade system is one 
in which the point of regulation coincides 
with the point of emission of covered 
greenhouse gases. Examples of this 
approach include the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative’s cap on power 
plant CO2 emissions or the cap on large 
industrial and utility sources in the 
European Union’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme. 
Emissions Cap: A mandated constraint in a 
scheduled timeframe that puts a “ceiling” 
on the total amount of anthropogenic 
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greenhouse gas emissions that can be 
released into the atmosphere. 
Emission Reductions (ERs): The 
measurable reduction of release of 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere 
from a specified activity or over a specified 
area, and a specified period of time. 
Emission Reduction Units (ERUs): A unit 
of emission reductions issued pursuant to 
Joint Implementation. This unit is equal to 
one metric ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent. 
Emissions Trading: The process or policy 
that allows the buying and selling of 
credits or allowances created under an 
emissions cap. 
European Union Allowances (EUAs): the 
allowances in use under the EU ETS. An 
EUA unit is equal to one metric ton of 
carbon dioxide equivalent. 
Grandfathering: A method by which 
emission allowances are freely distributed 
to entities covered under an emissions 
trading program based on historic 
emissions. 
Greenhouse Gases (GHGs): Greenhouse 
gases include a wide variety of gases that 
trap heat near the Earth’s surface, slowing 
its escape into space. Greenhouse gases 
include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide and water vapor and other gases. 
While greenhouse gases occur naturally in 
the atmosphere, human activities also 
result in additional greenhouse gas 
emissions. Humans have also 
manufactured some GHGs not found in 
nature (e.g., hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride) 
that slow the release of radiant energy 
into space. 
Joint Implementation (JI): Mechanism 
provided by Article 6 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, whereby a country included in 
Annex I of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol may acquire Emission Reduction 
Units when it helps to finance projects 
that reduce net emissions in another 
industrialized country (including countries 
with economies in transition). 
Kyoto Mechanisms (KMs): the three 
flexibility mechanisms that may be used 
by Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to 
fulfill their commitments through 
emissions trading (Art. 17). Those are the  
Joint Implementation (JI, Art. 6), Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM, Art. 12) 
and trading of Assigned Amount Units 
(AAUs). 
Kyoto Protocol: Adopted at the Third 
Conference of the Parties to the United 
Nations Convention on Climate Change 
held in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997, 
the Kyoto Protocol commits industrialized 
country signatories to reduce their 
greenhouse gas (or “carbon”) emissions by 
an average of 5.2% compared with 1990 
emissions, in the period 2008-2012.  
Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
(LULUCF): A greenhouse gas inventory 
sector that covers emissions and removal 
of greenhouse gases resulting from direct 
human-induced land use, land-use change 
and forestry activities. Expanding forests 
reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide; 
deforestation releases additional carbon 
dioxide; various agricultural activities may 
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add to atmospheric levels of methane and 
nitrous oxide. 
Leakage: Process by which emitters 
relocate activities to avoid regulation. 
Monitoring Plan (MP): A set of 
requirements for monitoring and 
verification of emission reductions 
achieved by a project. 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs): The 
documents, established by each Member 
State and reviewed by the European 
Commission, that specify the list of 
installations under the EU ETS and their 
absolute emissions caps, the amount of 
CERs and ERUs that may be used by these 
installations as well as other features such 
as the size of the new entrants reserve 
and the treatment of exiting installations 
or the process of allocation (free 
allocation or auctioning).  
Linking: Authorization by the regulator for 
entities covered under a cap and trade 
program to use allowances or offsets from 
a different jurisdiction’s regulatory regime 
(such as another cap and trade program) 
for compliance purposes. Linking may 
expand opportunities for low-cost 
emission reductions, resulting in lower 
compliance costs. 
Offset: Projects undertaken outside the 
coverage of a mandatory emissions 
reduction system for which the ownership 
of verifiable GHG emission reductions can 
be transferred and used by a regulated 
source to meet its emissions reduction 
obligation. If offsets are allowed in a cap 
and trade program, credits would be 
granted to an uncapped source for the net 
emissions reductions a project achieves. A 
capped source could then acquire these 
credits as a method of compliance under a 
cap. 
Project-Based Emission Reductions: 
Emission reductions that occur from 
projects pursuant to JI or CDM (as 
opposed to “emissions trading” or transfer 
of assigned amount units under Article 17 
of the Kyoto Protocol). 
Project Design Document (PDD): A project 
specific document required under the 
CDM rules which will enable the 
Operational Entity to determine whether 
the project (i) has been approved by the 
parties involved in a project, (ii) would 
result in reductions of greenhouse gas 
emissions that are additional, (iii) has an 
appropriate baseline and monitoring plan. 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation (REDD): A set of 
strategies and incentives (including 
performance-based) for reducing 
emissions from deforestation and 
degradation. 
Reforestation: This process increases the 
capacity of the land to sequester carbon 
by replanting forest biomass in areas 
where forests have been previously 
harvested. 
Registration: The formal acceptance by 
the CDM Executive Board of a validated 
project as a CDM project activity. 
Scope: The coverage of a cap and trade 
system, i.e., which sectors or emissions 
sources will be included. 
Sequestration: Sequestration refers to 
capture of carbon dioxide in a manner 
that prevents it from being released into 
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the atmosphere for a specified period of 
time. 
Source: Any process or activity that results 
in the net release of greenhouse gases, 
aerosols, or precursors of greenhouse 
gases into the atmosphere. 
Supplementarity: Following the 
Marrakesh Accords, the use of the Kyoto 
mechanisms shall be supplemental to 
domestic action, which shall thus 
constitute a significant element of the 
effort made by each Party to meet its 
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol. 
However there is no quantitative limit to 
the utilization of such mechanisms. While 
assessing the NAPs, the European 
Commission considered that the use of 
CDM and JI credits could not exceeded 
50% of the effort by each Member State 
to achieve its commitment. 
Supplementarity limits may thus affect 
demand for some categories of offsets. 
United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC): The 
international legal framework adopted in 
June 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit to 
address climate change. It commits the 
Parties to the UNFCCC to stabilize human 
induced greenhouse gas emissions at 
levels that would prevent dangerous 
manmade interference with the climate 
system.  
Updating: A form of allowance allocation 
in which allocations are reviewed and 
changed over time and/or awarded on the 
basis of changing circumstances rather 
than historical data. For example, 
updating can be based on megawatt-hours 
generated or tons of a product 
manufactured. 
Upstream system: An upstream approach 
to a cap-and-trade system places the point 
of regulation with the point of entry of 
fossil fuels into commerce within the 
covered region. 
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  Accounting Units             Each one equals one tonne of CO2 equivalent     
                      
                      
  AAU   Assigned Amount Unit   Emission allowance allocated to a 
              country under the Kyoto Protocol 
                      
  C E R   Certified Emission Reduction   Emission reduction expected from 
              a Clean Development Mechanism 
              (CDM) project     
                      
  RMU   Removal Unit     Emission reduction from land use, 
              land-use change and forestry activities 
              resulting from a CDM or a Joint 
              Implementation (JI) project   
                      
                      
  ERU   Emission Reduction Unit   Emission reduction from a JI project 
                      
                      
  VER   Voluntary Emission 
Reduction 
  Emission reduction from a voluntary 
              project not bound to any legal framework 
              or standard     
                      
  ( VER also means "Verified Emission Reduction", an acceptable unit for Chicago Climate   
  Exchange contracts, but not Kyoto )             
Table 9: Table of Accounting Units 
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SUMMARY 
 The international environmental treaty Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 and came 
into force in 2005, which aims at reducing GHG emissions and its impact in Global Warming. 
The Protocol introduced two policy instruments in order to achieve these targets cost 
effectively, project based mechanism and cap-and-trade. While these mechanisms can be 
used separately, a possible linkage between them may provide more low-cost mitigation 
option for polluters. 
 In order to show the advantages of disadvantages of linkage between these 
mechanisms this study investigates the mechanisms’ theoretical background and provides 
examples with the current significant programs. In its fourth section, the study analyzes the 
benefits of linkage, which are typically economic; lowering the cost of achieving emission 
reduction targets, broadening markets for emission allowances and market, increasing 
market liquidity, reducing price volatility, stimulating low carbon technology investment, 
contributing to sustainable development. And also the issues on linkage are analyzed which 
can be ordered as follows; double counting of the same emission reduction effort -this issue 
can be avoided through strict monitoring and regulation-, environmental concerns raising 
from project based activities –whether or not the activities realize a real and additional 
emission reduction-, supplementarity issue –should the credit use be restricted- and the 
raising concerns regarding developing countries –whether or not the project activities 
contribute to the developing countries’ sustainable development-.  
 The biggest multi-national and multi-sectoral cap and trade, European Union’s 
Emission Trading Scheme, is also studied in terms of its linkage with the two project based 
mechanisms which are introduced by the Kyoto Protocol, Clean Development Mechanism 
and Joint Implementation. The main rules of linkage and the rules to avoid possible issues 
arising from linkage are elaborated.  
 This study also concludes that the environmental concerns could be minimized very 
strict data collection, measurement and monitoring. These concerns can be minimized 
through gained experiences and new methods and technologies over years. And although it 
may bring on some environmental and design issues, the linkage is necessary and useful in 
terms of its economic benefits. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Als internationales Umweltabkommen trat das Kyoto Protokoll nach Unterzeichnung im Jahr 
1997 letztendlich 2005 in Kraft. Ziel des Protokolls ist es, den Ausstoß an Treibhausgasen und 
damit ihren Einfluss auf die globale Erwärmung zu reduzieren. 
Um die gesetzten Ziele kosteneffizient zu erreichen, wurden in diesem Rahmen zwei 
Politikinstrumente eingeführt, projektbasierte Mechanismen sowie ein „cap-and-trade“ 
System. 
Während diese Mechanismen eigentlich getrennt voneinander eingesetzt werden, könnte 
eine mögliche Verknüpfung hingegen eine Möglichkeit zur kostengünstigen Verringerung für 
die Emittenten darstellen. 
Diese Arbeit untersucht die theoretischen Hintergründe der genannten Mechanismen und 
zeigt Beispiele derzeit wesentlicher Programme auf, mit dem Ziel die Vor- und Nachteile 
einer solchen Verbindung herauszustellen. Im weiteren Verlauf der Forschungsarbeit werden 
Nutzenaspekte einer Verknüpfung analysiert, die üblicherweise ökonomischer Natur sind: 
eine Senkung der Kosten für eine Erreichung der Reduktionsziele, ein Ausweiten der Märkte 
für Emissionsrechte, eine Erhöhung der Marktliquidität, eine Reduktion der Preisvolatilität, 
die Schaffung von Investitionsanreizen für CO2 effiziente Technologien, sowie das Leisten 
eines Beitrages zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung.  
Des Weiteren werden die Kernpunkte einer Verknüpfung problematisiert. Hierzu gehört die 
doppelte Berechnung der selben Leistung zur Reduktion von Emissionen, welche durch 
strenge Überwachung und Regulation vermieden werden kann.  Einen weiteren Aspekt 
stellen ökologische Bedenken resultierend aus projektbasierten Aktivitäten dar, die mit der 
Frage verbunden sind, ob die Aktivitäten überhaupt zu einer realen zusätzlichen Reduktion 
der Emissionen führen. Zusätzlich werden ergänzende Problemstellungen angeführt, wie die 
Überlegung, ob die Möglichkeiten zu Kreditnutzung begrenzt werden sollten, sowie 
wachsende Bedenken hinsichtlich der Entwicklungsländer thematisiert. Hier steht die Frage 
im Mittelpunkt, in wie weit, wenn überhaupt, die Projektaktivitäten zur nachhaltigen 
Entwicklung der Entwicklungsländer beitragen. 
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Das größte multi-nationale und multi-sektorale „cap-and-trade“ System, das Emission 
Trading Scheme (ETS) der europäischen Union, wird außerdem hinsichtlich der Verbindung 
der zwei projektbasierten Mechanismen, welche durch das Kyoto Protokoll eingeführt 
worden sind, untersucht. Diese sind die gemeinsamen Umsetzung sowie der Mechanismus 
zur umweltverträglichen Entwicklung. Die grundlegenden Richtlinien der Verknüpfung und 
die Regeln zur Verhinderung möglicher Probleme, die hierdurch entstehen können, werden 
in der Folge ausgearbeitet. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die ökologischen Bedenken nur durch 
eine Kombination aus strenger Datenerhebung und Bemessung, sowie lückenloser 
Überwachung ausgeräumt werden können. Neue Technologien und Methoden und vor 
allem die wachsende Erfahrung werden weiters unterstützend hierzu beitragen. Und obwohl 
Verknüpfungen sicherlich auch Herausforderungen an Art und Aufbau der jetzigen 
Rahmenbedingungen des Emissionshandels stellen werden, sind sie aufgrund ihres 
ökonomischen Nutzens als notwendig zu erachten. 
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